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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of secure parameter estimation when the estimation algorithm is
prone to causative attacks. Causative attacks, in principle, target decision-making algorithms (e.g., in-
ference and learning algorithms) to alter their decisions by making them oblivious to specific attacks.
Such attacks influence inference algorithms by tampering with the mechanism through which the al-
gorithm is provided with the statistical model of the population about which an inferential decision is
made. Causative attacks are viable, for instance, by contaminating the historical or training data, or by
compromising an expert who provides the model. In the presence of causative attacks, the inference
algorithms operate under a distorted statistical model for the population from which they collect data
samples. This paper introduces specific notions of secure estimation and provides a framework under
which secure estimation under causative attacks can be formulated. A central premise underlying the se-
cure estimation framework is that forming secure estimates introduces a new dimension to the estimation
objective, which pertains to detecting attacks and isolating the true model. Since detection and isolation
decisions themselves are imperfect, their inclusion induces an inherent coupling between the desired
secure estimation objective and the auxiliary detection and isolation decisions that need to be formed in
conjunction with the estimates. This paper establishes the fundamental interplay among the decisions
involved, and characterizes the general decision rules in closed-forms for any desired estimation cost
function. Furthermore, to circumvent the computational complexity associated with growing parameter
dimension or attack complexity, a scalable estimation algorithm and its attendant optimality guarantees
are provided. Finally, the theory developed is applied to secure parameter estimation in a sensor network
operating in an adversarial environment.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Statistical inference offers mechanisms for deducing the statistical properties of a population based on the
data sampled from the population. Inference problems, broadly, focus on discerning the statistical model of
the population or forming estimates about an unknown parameter that specifies the statistical model of the
population. Anomaly detection, which has diverse applications in intrusion detection, fraud detection, fault
detection, system health monitoring, and event detection, constitutes a major class of inference problems in
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which the objective is raising alarms when the data pattern (e.g., statistical model) deviates significantly from
the expected patterns. Effective detection of anomalies in the data strongly hinges on the known rules for
distinguishing normal and abnormal data segments. These rules, for instance, can be specified by an expert
or by leveraging the historical data, depending on the context of the application. These rules, subsequently,
can be used for designing inference algorithms for detecting the anomalies with specified guarantees on
relevant figures of merit.
While anomaly detection, which in essence copes with the vulnerability of the sampled data to being
contaminated or compromised, has been studied extensively (c.f. [1–3]), the vulnerability of the inference
algorithms to being compromised is far less-investigated. The nature of security vulnerabilities that in-
ference algorithms are exposed to is fundamentally distinct from that of data. Specifically, in the case of
compromised sample data, the information of the decision algorithm about the model remains intact, while
the data fed to the algorithm is anomalous, in which case the counter-measures consist of winnowing out the
compromised samples and forming inferential rules that are robust against them. In contrast, attacks on the
algorithms can be exerted by providing the algorithm with an incorrect statistical model for the data. This is
viable by, for instance, contaminating the historical data or by confusing the expert that produces a model,
which are critical for furnishing the true model for the statistical model of the data. Therefore, when the sam-
pled data is compromised, an inference algorithm produces decisions based on an un-compromised known
model for the data, while the data that it receives and processes are compromised. On the other hand, when
the historical data or the expert are compromised, an inference algorithm functions based on an incorrect
model for the data, in which case even un-compromised sampled data produces unreliable decisions.
The aforementioned security vulnerabilities for the inference algorithms can be capitalized on by adver-
saries in order to force an inference algorithm to deviate from its optimal structure and produce decisions
in ways that serve an adversary’s purposes. Such attacks on decision algorithms are often referred to as
causative attacks, through which an adversary aims to (i) make the inference algorithms oblivious to spe-
cific attacks, or (ii) degrade the performance of the inference algorithm in the presence of such an attack [4].
While the notion of secure decision-making in adjacent domains (e.g., machine learning and data min-
ing) has been heavily investigated in recent years, the fundamental limits of secure statistical inference are
not well-investigated, and all the limited existing studies remain rather ad-hoc. In this paper, we provide a
framework for secure parameter estimation under the potential presence of causative attacks. We establish
the fundamental tradeoffs involved in decision-making under causative attacks and characterize the optimal
decision rules for securely estimating the parameters and concurrently detecting the presence of the attack-
ers. Furthermore, we provide scalable algorithms for addressing settings in which the size or complexity of
the attacks grow, and provide optimality guarantees on the performance of these algorithms. A summary of
the content and the contributions are discussed in Section 1.2, and the relevant literature on secure statistical
inference are reviewed in Section 1.3.
2
1.2 Overview and Contributions
To lay the context for discussing the problem investigated, consider the canonical parameter estimation
problem in which we have a collection of probability distributions {PX : X ∈ X} defined over a common
measurable space. The objective is to estimate X , which lies in a known set X ⊆ Rp, from data samples
Y , [Y1, . . . , Yn], where the sample Yr is distributed according to PX and lies in a known set Y ⊆ Rm. We
denote the probability density functions (pdfs) that the statistician assumes about the underlying distributions
of X and Yr by pi and f(· | X), respectively, i.e.,
Yr ∼ f(· | X) , with X ∼ pi . (1)
For convenience in the analysis, we will assume that the pdfs do not have any non-zero probability masses
over lower-dimensional manifolds. The objective of the statistician is formalizing a reliable estimator
Xˆ(Y) : Yn 7→ X . (2)
Causative Attacks: In an adversarial environment, a malicious attacker might launch a causative attack
to influence (degrade) the quality of Xˆ(Y). The purpose of such an attack is to compromise the process
that underlies acquiring the statistical models. We emphasize that such an attack is different from those
that aim to compromise the data, e.g., false data injection attacks, which aim to distort the data samples Y.
Consequently, the effect of a causative attack is misleading the statistician about the true model f(· | X) that
it assumes about the data. Such attacks are possible by compromising the historical (or training) data that
is used for defining a model for the data. Depending on the specificity and the extent of a causative attack,
e.g., the fraction of the historical or training data that is compromised, the true model f(· | X) can deviate
to alternative forms, the space of which we denote by F . The attack can affect the statistical distribution of
any number of the m coordinates of Y. There are two major aspects to selecting F as viable model space.
• An attack is effective if the compromised model is sufficiently distinct from the model assumed by the
statistician. Hence, even though in general F can be any representation of possible kernels f(· | X)
mapping Y to Rm, only a subset of such mappings suffices to describe the set of effective attacks.
• There exists a tradeoff between the complexity of the model space and its expressiveness. Specifi-
cally, if it is overly expressive, it can represent the possible compromised models with a more refined
accuracy at the expense of more complex inferential rules.
The specifics of the attack model will be discussed in Section 2.
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(q, β)-Security: The potential presence of an adversary introduces a new dimension to the estimation prob-
lem in (2). Specifically, on the one hand, the stochastic model of the data can be altered by an attack and
detecting whether the data model is compromised, itself being an inference task, is never perfect. On the
other hand, designing an optimal estimation rule strongly hinges on successfully isolating the true model.
Hence, there exists an inherent coupling between the original estimation problem of interest and the intro-
duced auxiliary problem (i.e., detecting the presence of an attacker and isolating the true model). Based on
this observation, in an adversarial setting, there exists uncertainty about the true model, based on which the
quality of the estimator is expected to degrade with respect to an attack-free setting. We are interested in
establishing the fundamental interplay between the quality of discerning the true model and the degradation
level in the estimation quality. To establish this interplay, we say that an estimator is (q, β)-secure if its
estimation cost is weaker than that of the attack-free setting by a factor q ∈ [1,+∞), while missing at most
β ∈ (0, 1] fraction of the attacks1.
In this paper, we pursue three intertwined objectives. First, we characterize the fundamental tradeoffs
between q and β and delineate a tradeoff curve. Secondly, we characterize the inference rules in closed-
forms and provide a secure estimation algorithm that achieves the optimal tradeoffs for any desired point on
the tradeoff curve. Finally, to circumvent the computational complexity as the the dimension of the data, p,
grows, or the complexity of the attacks scales up (e.g., the number of coordinates compromised), we provide
a scalable algorithm that has low computational complexity with guaranteed optimality in the asymptote of
large data dimension p.
1.3 Related Studies
The problem of secure inference is studied primarily in the context of sensor networks. The study in [5], in
particular, considers a two-sensor network in which one sensor is known to be secured, and one sensor is
vulnerable to attacks. The objective is forming an estimate based on the mean-squared error criterion, for
which a heuristic detection-driven estimator is designed. According to this design, first, a decision is formed
about whether the unsecured sensor is attacked. If it is deemed to be attacked, then the estimator will rely
only on the secured sensor, and otherwise, it uses the data from both sensors. Unlike in [5], we consider
a model with arbitrary size, assume that all data coordinates are vulnerable to the attack, and characterize
the optimal decision structure, which turns out to be different from being a detection-driven design studied
in [5]. Through a case study, we will also show the rather significant improvement in the estimation quality
when using the optimal rules, compared to the rules specified in [5].
The adversarial setting defined in this paper is also similar to the widely-studied Byzantine attack models
in sensor networks, in which the data generated by the compromised sensors are modified arbitrarily by the
adversaries in order to degrade or the inference quality. An overview of the impact of Byzantine attacks on
1Estimation costs and the associated estimation degradation factor q will be defined in Section 2.3.
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inference quality in sensor networks and relevant mitigation strategies are discussed in [2]. Detection-driven
estimation strategies (i.e., when attack detection precedes the estimation routine) when the effect of the
Byzantine attacks are characterized by randomly flipping of the information bits generated by the sensors are
discussed in [6–9]. Furthermore, attack-resilient target localization strategies are investigated in [3] and [6],
where it is assumed that the attacker adopts a fixed strategy for maximum disruption to the inference. In
these studies, nevertheless, an attacker may deviate from the worst-case strategy of incurring the maximum
damage in order to launch a less powerful but sustained attack, which may not be detected perfectly. Finally,
strategies for isolating the compromised nodes in sensor networks are investigated in [10–12]. The emphasis
of these studies is primarily focused on detecting attacks, or isolating the attacked sensors, which is different
from the scope of our paper, which is focused on parameter estimation.
The problem of secure estimation in linear dynamical systems in the context of cyber-physical sys-
tems has been studied extensively in the recent years (c.f. [13–19]). The studies that are more relevant to
the scope of this paper include [14], [18], and [19], which focus on the robust estimation of the states in
dynamic systems. Specifically, a coding-theoretic interplay between the number of sensors compromised
and the guarantees on perfect state recovery is characterized in [14], a Kalman filter-based approach for
identifying the most reliable set of sensors to make an inference from is investigated in [18], and design-
ing estimators that are robust against dynamical model uncertainty is studied in [19]. The degradation in
estimation performance in a dynamical system consisting of a single sensor network is studied from the ad-
versary’s perspective in [20], where the bounds on the degradation in estimation performance with degrees
of stealthiness of the attacker are characterized.
All the aforementioned studies that involve secure estimation, irrespective of their focus or objective,
conform in their design principle, which decouples the estimation decisions from all other decisions in-
volved (e.g., attack detection or attacked sensor isolation), and produces either detection-driven estimators
or estimation-driven detection routines. In the detection-driven estimation routines, an initial decision re-
garding the presence of an adversary (e.g., based on Neyman-Pearson theory) is followed by an optimal
estimator based on the detection decision (e.g., Bayesian estimation). Such approaches implicitly assume
that the detection decision has been perfect. Similarly, in an estimation-driven approach, the unknown pa-
rameter is first estimated, and then a detection decision is made (e.g., the generalized likelihood ratio test).
Such approaches achieve optimality conditions only asymptotically, i.e., under the assumption of having
an infinite number of measurements. The premise that decoupling such intertwined estimation and detec-
tion problems into independent estimation and detection routines is sub-optimal is well-investigated (e.g.,
in [21–24]).
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2 Data Model and Definitions
2.1 Attack Model
Our focus is on the canonical estimation problem in (2). The objective is to form an optimal estimate Xˆ(Y)
(under the general cost functions specified later) in the potential presence of a causative attack. Under the
attack-free setting, the data is assumed to be generated according to the known distribution
Yr ∼ f(· | X) , with X ∼ pi , for r ∈ {1, . . . n} . (3)
In an adversarial setting, an adversary, depending on its strength and preference, can launch an attack that
can compromise the underlying process that the statistician uses for acquiring f(· | X). An attack will be
carried out for the ultimate purpose of degrading the estimation quality of X . We assume that the adversary
can corrupt the data model of up to K ∈ {1, . . . ,m} coordinates of Y. Hence, for a given K, there exist
T =
∑K
i=1
(
m
i
)
number of attack scenarios under which the compromised data models are distinct. Define
S , {S1, . . . , ST } as the set of all possible combinations of attack scenarios, where Si ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}
describes the set of coordinates the models of which are compromised under scenario i ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Under the attack scenario i ∈ {1, . . . , T}, the joint distribution of Yr deviates from f and changes to
a model in the space Fi. As discussed earlier, there exists a tradeoff between the expressiveness of this
space and the complexity of the ensuing inferential rules. Specifically, a larger space Fi can distinguish
different attack strategies with a more accurate resolution at the expense of high complexity in the analysis
and the resulting decision rules. Also, the model can be effective if it encompasses sufficiently distinct
models. Throughout the analysis of the paper, we assume that Fi , {fi(· | X)}, i.e., Fi consists of one
alternative distribution. This is primarily for the convenience in notations, and all the results presented can
be generalized to any arbitrary space with countable elements. Based on this model, when the data models in
the coordinates contained in Si are compromised, the joint distribution changes from f(· | X) to fi(· | X).
Different attack scenarios might occur with different likelihoods, e.g., compromising one coordinate is
easier than compromising two, and it might turn out to be more likely. To distinguish such likelihoods we
adopt a Bayesian framework in which we define 0 as the prior probability of having an attack-free sce-
nario and define i as the prior probability of the event that the attacker compromises the model under the
coordinates specified by Si. A block diagram of the attack model and the inferential goals to be charac-
terized, which are discussed in the remainder of this section, is depicted in Fig. 1. Finally, we define the
marginal pdf of the data at coordinate l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} under the attack-free setting and when the coordinate
is compromised by g0l and g
1
l , respectively.
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  = [ 1, . . . ,  T ]
<latexit sha1_base64="cXaqmq6A0CGKuRMe5mHMOordmS I=">AAACFHicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3wSIIlpKIqBuh4MZlhb4gCWEymbRDJw9mboQS+hFu/BU3LhRx68Kdf+OkzUJbDw z3zLn3ztx7/JQzCab5rVVWVtfWN6qbta3tnd09ff+gJ5NMENolCU/EwMeSchbTLjDgdJAKiiOf074/vi3y/QcqJEviDkxS 6kZ4GLOQEQxK8vQzx094ICeRCk5AOeAbex49q+EECchGee24nl43m+YMxjKxSlJHJdqe/qVeIFlEYyAcS2lbZgpujgUwwu m05mSSppiM8ZDaisY4otLNZ0tNjROlBEaYCHViMGbq744cR7KYW1VGGEZyMVeI/+XsDMJrN2dxmgGNyfyjMOMGJEbhkBEw QQnwiSKYCKZmNcgIC0xA+VhTJliLKy+T3nnTMpvW/UW9dVnaUUVH6BidIgtdoRa6Q23URQQ9omf0it60J+1Fe9c+5qUVre w5RH+gff4AAPWeuA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="cXaqmq6A0CGKuRMe5mHMOordmS I=">AAACFHicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3wSIIlpKIqBuh4MZlhb4gCWEymbRDJw9mboQS+hFu/BU3LhRx68Kdf+OkzUJbDw z3zLn3ztx7/JQzCab5rVVWVtfWN6qbta3tnd09ff+gJ5NMENolCU/EwMeSchbTLjDgdJAKiiOf074/vi3y/QcqJEviDkxS 6kZ4GLOQEQxK8vQzx094ICeRCk5AOeAbex49q+EECchGee24nl43m+YMxjKxSlJHJdqe/qVeIFlEYyAcS2lbZgpujgUwwu m05mSSppiM8ZDaisY4otLNZ0tNjROlBEaYCHViMGbq744cR7KYW1VGGEZyMVeI/+XsDMJrN2dxmgGNyfyjMOMGJEbhkBEw QQnwiSKYCKZmNcgIC0xA+VhTJliLKy+T3nnTMpvW/UW9dVnaUUVH6BidIgtdoRa6Q23URQQ9omf0it60J+1Fe9c+5qUVre w5RH+gff4AAPWeuA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="cXaqmq6A0CGKuRMe5mHMOordmS I=">AAACFHicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3wSIIlpKIqBuh4MZlhb4gCWEymbRDJw9mboQS+hFu/BU3LhRx68Kdf+OkzUJbDw z3zLn3ztx7/JQzCab5rVVWVtfWN6qbta3tnd09ff+gJ5NMENolCU/EwMeSchbTLjDgdJAKiiOf074/vi3y/QcqJEviDkxS 6kZ4GLOQEQxK8vQzx094ICeRCk5AOeAbex49q+EECchGee24nl43m+YMxjKxSlJHJdqe/qVeIFlEYyAcS2lbZgpujgUwwu m05mSSppiM8ZDaisY4otLNZ0tNjROlBEaYCHViMGbq744cR7KYW1VGGEZyMVeI/+XsDMJrN2dxmgGNyfyjMOMGJEbhkBEw QQnwiSKYCKZmNcgIC0xA+VhTJliLKy+T3nnTMpvW/UW9dVnaUUVH6BidIgtdoRa6Q23URQQ9omf0it60J+1Fe9c+5qUVre w5RH+gff4AAPWeuA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="cXaqmq6A0CGKuRMe5mHMOordmS I=">AAACFHicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3wSIIlpKIqBuh4MZlhb4gCWEymbRDJw9mboQS+hFu/BU3LhRx68Kdf+OkzUJbDw z3zLn3ztx7/JQzCab5rVVWVtfWN6qbta3tnd09ff+gJ5NMENolCU/EwMeSchbTLjDgdJAKiiOf074/vi3y/QcqJEviDkxS 6kZ4GLOQEQxK8vQzx094ICeRCk5AOeAbex49q+EECchGee24nl43m+YMxjKxSlJHJdqe/qVeIFlEYyAcS2lbZgpujgUwwu m05mSSppiM8ZDaisY4otLNZ0tNjROlBEaYCHViMGbq744cR7KYW1VGGEZyMVeI/+XsDMJrN2dxmgGNyfyjMOMGJEbhkBEw QQnwiSKYCKZmNcgIC0xA+VhTJliLKy+T3nnTMpvW/UW9dVnaUUVH6BidIgtdoRa6Q23URQQ9omf0it60J+1Fe9c+5qUVre w5RH+gff4AAPWeuA==</latexit>
Xˆ(Y)
<latexit sha1_base64="5az7XKEgBNmuauLjP/TAzQhGzz Y=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoMQL2FXRD0GvHiMYB6SXcLsZDYZMvtwpjcQlnyHFw+KePVjvPk3TpI9aGJBQ1 HVTXeXn0ih0ba/rcLa+sbmVnG7tLO7t39QPjxq6ThVjDdZLGPV8anmUkS8iQIl7ySK09CXvO2Pbmd+e8yVFnH0gJOEeyEd RCIQjKKRPHdIkXSqrh+Qx/NeuWLX7DnIKnFyUoEcjV75y+3HLA15hExSrbuOnaCXUYWCST4tuanmCWUjOuBdQyMacu1l86 On5MwofRLEylSEZK7+nshoqPUk9E1nSHGol72Z+J/XTTG48TIRJSnyiC0WBakkGJNZAqQvFGcoJ4ZQpoS5lbAhVZShyalk QnCWX14lrYuaY9ec+8tK/SqPowgncApVcOAa6nAHDWgCgyd4hld4s8bWi/VufSxaC1Y+cwx/YH3+ABECkO8=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5az7XKEgBNmuauLjP/TAzQhGzz Y=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoMQL2FXRD0GvHiMYB6SXcLsZDYZMvtwpjcQlnyHFw+KePVjvPk3TpI9aGJBQ1 HVTXeXn0ih0ba/rcLa+sbmVnG7tLO7t39QPjxq6ThVjDdZLGPV8anmUkS8iQIl7ySK09CXvO2Pbmd+e8yVFnH0gJOEeyEd RCIQjKKRPHdIkXSqrh+Qx/NeuWLX7DnIKnFyUoEcjV75y+3HLA15hExSrbuOnaCXUYWCST4tuanmCWUjOuBdQyMacu1l86 On5MwofRLEylSEZK7+nshoqPUk9E1nSHGol72Z+J/XTTG48TIRJSnyiC0WBakkGJNZAqQvFGcoJ4ZQpoS5lbAhVZShyalk QnCWX14lrYuaY9ec+8tK/SqPowgncApVcOAa6nAHDWgCgyd4hld4s8bWi/VufSxaC1Y+cwx/YH3+ABECkO8=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5az7XKEgBNmuauLjP/TAzQhGzz Y=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoMQL2FXRD0GvHiMYB6SXcLsZDYZMvtwpjcQlnyHFw+KePVjvPk3TpI9aGJBQ1 HVTXeXn0ih0ba/rcLa+sbmVnG7tLO7t39QPjxq6ThVjDdZLGPV8anmUkS8iQIl7ySK09CXvO2Pbmd+e8yVFnH0gJOEeyEd RCIQjKKRPHdIkXSqrh+Qx/NeuWLX7DnIKnFyUoEcjV75y+3HLA15hExSrbuOnaCXUYWCST4tuanmCWUjOuBdQyMacu1l86 On5MwofRLEylSEZK7+nshoqPUk9E1nSHGol72Z+J/XTTG48TIRJSnyiC0WBakkGJNZAqQvFGcoJ4ZQpoS5lbAhVZShyalk QnCWX14lrYuaY9ec+8tK/SqPowgncApVcOAa6nAHDWgCgyd4hld4s8bWi/VufSxaC1Y+cwx/YH3+ABECkO8=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="5az7XKEgBNmuauLjP/TAzQhGzz Y=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoMQL2FXRD0GvHiMYB6SXcLsZDYZMvtwpjcQlnyHFw+KePVjvPk3TpI9aGJBQ1 HVTXeXn0ih0ba/rcLa+sbmVnG7tLO7t39QPjxq6ThVjDdZLGPV8anmUkS8iQIl7ySK09CXvO2Pbmd+e8yVFnH0gJOEeyEd RCIQjKKRPHdIkXSqrh+Qx/NeuWLX7DnIKnFyUoEcjV75y+3HLA15hExSrbuOnaCXUYWCST4tuanmCWUjOuBdQyMacu1l86 On5MwofRLEylSEZK7+nshoqPUk9E1nSHGol72Z+J/XTTG48TIRJSnyiC0WBakkGJNZAqQvFGcoJ4ZQpoS5lbAhVZShyalk QnCWX14lrYuaY9ec+8tK/SqPowgncApVcOAa6nAHDWgCgyd4hld4s8bWi/VufSxaC1Y+cwx/YH3+ABECkO8=</latexit>
detector
<latexit sha1_base64="DZQNJE4lS+LKATSt0RBbI7EZQ3 w=">AAAB83icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0l60WPBi8cK9gOaUDabTbt0swm7E6GE/g0vHhTx6p/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu /NMDMvzKQw6LrfTmVre2d3r7pfOzg8Oj6pn571TJprxrsslakehNRwKRTvokDJB5nmNAkl74fTu4Xff+LaiFQ94izjQULH SsSCUbSS75uYRBw5w1SP6g236S5BNolXkgaU6IzqX36UsjzhCpmkxgw9N8OgoBoFk3xe83PDM8qmdMyHliqacBMUy5vn5M oqEYlTbUshWaq/JwqaGDNLQtuZUJyYdW8h/ucNc4xvg0KoLEeu2GpRnEuCKVkEQCKh7btyZgllWthbCZtQTRnamGo2BG/9 5U3SazU9t+k9tBptt4yjChdwCdfgwQ204R460AUGGTzDK7w5ufPivDsfq9aKU86cwx84nz/yt5GN</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="DZQNJE4lS+LKATSt0RBbI7EZQ3 w=">AAAB83icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0l60WPBi8cK9gOaUDabTbt0swm7E6GE/g0vHhTx6p/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu /NMDMvzKQw6LrfTmVre2d3r7pfOzg8Oj6pn571TJprxrsslakehNRwKRTvokDJB5nmNAkl74fTu4Xff+LaiFQ94izjQULH SsSCUbSS75uYRBw5w1SP6g236S5BNolXkgaU6IzqX36UsjzhCpmkxgw9N8OgoBoFk3xe83PDM8qmdMyHliqacBMUy5vn5M oqEYlTbUshWaq/JwqaGDNLQtuZUJyYdW8h/ucNc4xvg0KoLEeu2GpRnEuCKVkEQCKh7btyZgllWthbCZtQTRnamGo2BG/9 5U3SazU9t+k9tBptt4yjChdwCdfgwQ204R460AUGGTzDK7w5ufPivDsfq9aKU86cwx84nz/yt5GN</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="DZQNJE4lS+LKATSt0RBbI7EZQ3 w=">AAAB83icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0l60WPBi8cK9gOaUDabTbt0swm7E6GE/g0vHhTx6p/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu /NMDMvzKQw6LrfTmVre2d3r7pfOzg8Oj6pn571TJprxrsslakehNRwKRTvokDJB5nmNAkl74fTu4Xff+LaiFQ94izjQULH SsSCUbSS75uYRBw5w1SP6g236S5BNolXkgaU6IzqX36UsjzhCpmkxgw9N8OgoBoFk3xe83PDM8qmdMyHliqacBMUy5vn5M oqEYlTbUshWaq/JwqaGDNLQtuZUJyYdW8h/ucNc4xvg0KoLEeu2GpRnEuCKVkEQCKh7btyZgllWthbCZtQTRnamGo2BG/9 5U3SazU9t+k9tBptt4yjChdwCdfgwQ204R460AUGGTzDK7w5ufPivDsfq9aKU86cwx84nz/yt5GN</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="DZQNJE4lS+LKATSt0RBbI7EZQ3 w=">AAAB83icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0l60WPBi8cK9gOaUDabTbt0swm7E6GE/g0vHhTx6p/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu /NMDMvzKQw6LrfTmVre2d3r7pfOzg8Oj6pn571TJprxrsslakehNRwKRTvokDJB5nmNAkl74fTu4Xff+LaiFQ94izjQULH SsSCUbSS75uYRBw5w1SP6g236S5BNolXkgaU6IzqX36UsjzhCpmkxgw9N8OgoBoFk3xe83PDM8qmdMyHliqacBMUy5vn5M oqEYlTbUshWaq/JwqaGDNLQtuZUJyYdW8h/ucNc4xvg0KoLEeu2GpRnEuCKVkEQCKh7btyZgllWthbCZtQTRnamGo2BG/9 5U3SazU9t+k9tBptt4yjChdwCdfgwQ204R460AUGGTzDK7w5ufPivDsfq9aKU86cwx84nz/yt5GN</latexit>
estimator
<latexit sha1_base64="rFBO2uAuj4/rkMgJkWbGHvo4/s o=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgMxFL1TX7W+qi7dBIvgqsx0o8uCG5cV7APaoWTSO21oJhmTTKEM/Q43LhRx68e4829MHwttPRA4nH Mv9+REqeDG+v63V9ja3tndK+6XDg6Pjk/Kp2ctozLNsMmUULoTUYOCS2xabgV2Uo00iQS2o/Hd3G9PUBuu5KOdphgmdCh5 zBm1Tgp7JiZoLE+oVbpfrvhVfwGySYIVqcAKjX75qzdQLEtQWiaoMd3AT22YU205Ezgr9TKDKWVjOsSuo5ImaMJ8EXpGrp wyILHS7klLFurvjZwmxkyTyE26dCOz7s3F/7xuZuPbMOcyzSxKtjwUZ4JYReYNkAHXyKyYOkKZ5i4rYSOqKbOup5IrIVj/ 8iZp1aqBXw0eapW6v6qjCBdwCdcQwA3U4R4a0AQGT/AMr/DmTbwX7937WI4WvNXOOfyB9/kD29uSFQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rFBO2uAuj4/rkMgJkWbGHvo4/s o=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgMxFL1TX7W+qi7dBIvgqsx0o8uCG5cV7APaoWTSO21oJhmTTKEM/Q43LhRx68e4829MHwttPRA4nH Mv9+REqeDG+v63V9ja3tndK+6XDg6Pjk/Kp2ctozLNsMmUULoTUYOCS2xabgV2Uo00iQS2o/Hd3G9PUBuu5KOdphgmdCh5 zBm1Tgp7JiZoLE+oVbpfrvhVfwGySYIVqcAKjX75qzdQLEtQWiaoMd3AT22YU205Ezgr9TKDKWVjOsSuo5ImaMJ8EXpGrp wyILHS7klLFurvjZwmxkyTyE26dCOz7s3F/7xuZuPbMOcyzSxKtjwUZ4JYReYNkAHXyKyYOkKZ5i4rYSOqKbOup5IrIVj/ 8iZp1aqBXw0eapW6v6qjCBdwCdcQwA3U4R4a0AQGT/AMr/DmTbwX7937WI4WvNXOOfyB9/kD29uSFQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rFBO2uAuj4/rkMgJkWbGHvo4/s o=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgMxFL1TX7W+qi7dBIvgqsx0o8uCG5cV7APaoWTSO21oJhmTTKEM/Q43LhRx68e4829MHwttPRA4nH Mv9+REqeDG+v63V9ja3tndK+6XDg6Pjk/Kp2ctozLNsMmUULoTUYOCS2xabgV2Uo00iQS2o/Hd3G9PUBuu5KOdphgmdCh5 zBm1Tgp7JiZoLE+oVbpfrvhVfwGySYIVqcAKjX75qzdQLEtQWiaoMd3AT22YU205Ezgr9TKDKWVjOsSuo5ImaMJ8EXpGrp wyILHS7klLFurvjZwmxkyTyE26dCOz7s3F/7xuZuPbMOcyzSxKtjwUZ4JYReYNkAHXyKyYOkKZ5i4rYSOqKbOup5IrIVj/ 8iZp1aqBXw0eapW6v6qjCBdwCdcQwA3U4R4a0AQGT/AMr/DmTbwX7937WI4WvNXOOfyB9/kD29uSFQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="hP+6LrUf2d3tZaldqaQQvEKMXy w=">AAAB2XicbZDNSgMxFIXv1L86Vq1rN8EiuCozbnQpuHFZwbZCO5RM5k4bmskMyR2hDH0BF25EfC93vo3pz0JbDwQ+zk nIvSculLQUBN9ebWd3b/+gfugfNfzjk9Nmo2fz0gjsilzl5jnmFpXU2CVJCp8LgzyLFfbj6f0i77+gsTLXTzQrMMr4WMtU Ck7O6oyaraAdLMW2IVxDC9YaNb+GSS7KDDUJxa0dhEFBUcUNSaFw7g9LiwUXUz7GgUPNM7RRtRxzzi6dk7A0N+5oYkv394 uKZ9bOstjdzDhN7Ga2MP/LBiWlt1EldVESarH6KC0Vo5wtdmaJNChIzRxwYaSblYkJN1yQa8Z3HYSbG29D77odBu3wMYA6 nMMFXEEIN3AHD9CBLghI4BXevYn35n2suqp569LO4I+8zx84xIo4</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SbrMd9AgDEBmfeFAO4FovzYpqT U=">AAAB6XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxijRq9eBoPgKex60aPgxWME84BkCbOT3mTI7Ow60xsIS77DiwdF/CFv/o2Tx0GNBQNFVT ddU1GmpCXf//JKW9s7u3vl/cpB9fDouHZSbds0NwJbIlWp6UbcopIaWyRJYTczyJNIYSea3C38zhSNlal+pFmGYcJHWsZS cHJS2LcxQ0sy4ZSaQa3uN/wl2CYJ1qQOazQHtc/+MBV5gpqE4tb2Aj+jsOCGpFA4r/RzixkXEz7CnqOaJ2jDYhl6zi6cMm RxatzTxJbqz42CJ9bOkshNunRj+9dbiP95vZzim7CQOssJtVgdinPFKGWLBthQGhSkZo5wYaTLysSYGy7I9VRxJQR/v7xJ 2leNwG8EDz6U4QzO4RICuIZbuIcmtEDAEzzDK7x5U+/Fe1/VVfLWvZ3CL3gf35Z4kMo=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SbrMd9AgDEBmfeFAO4FovzYpqT U=">AAAB6XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxijRq9eBoPgKex60aPgxWME84BkCbOT3mTI7Ow60xsIS77DiwdF/CFv/o2Tx0GNBQNFVT ddU1GmpCXf//JKW9s7u3vl/cpB9fDouHZSbds0NwJbIlWp6UbcopIaWyRJYTczyJNIYSea3C38zhSNlal+pFmGYcJHWsZS cHJS2LcxQ0sy4ZSaQa3uN/wl2CYJ1qQOazQHtc/+MBV5gpqE4tb2Aj+jsOCGpFA4r/RzixkXEz7CnqOaJ2jDYhl6zi6cMm RxatzTxJbqz42CJ9bOkshNunRj+9dbiP95vZzim7CQOssJtVgdinPFKGWLBthQGhSkZo5wYaTLysSYGy7I9VRxJQR/v7xJ 2leNwG8EDz6U4QzO4RICuIZbuIcmtEDAEzzDK7x5U+/Fe1/VVfLWvZ3CL3gf35Z4kMo=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="dvhZEOE/iY/LBpnRuzBO3Er4Bz E=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgMxFM34rPVVdekmWARXZcaNLgtuXFawD2iHkknvtKGZZEzuFMrQ73DjQhG3fow7/8a0nYW2Hggczr mXe3KiVAqLvv/tbWxube/slvbK+weHR8eVk9OW1Znh0ORaatOJmAUpFDRRoIROaoAlkYR2NL6b++0JGCu0esRpCmHChkrE gjN0UtizMQWLImGoTb9S9Wv+AnSdBAWpkgKNfuWrN9A8S0Ahl8zabuCnGObMoOASZuVeZiFlfMyG0HVUsQRsmC9Cz+ilUw Y01sY9hXSh/t7IWWLtNIncpEs3sqveXPzP62YY34a5UGmGoPjyUJxJiprOG6ADYYCjnDrCuBEuK+UjZhhH11PZlRCsfnmd tK5rgV8LHvxq3S/qKJFzckGuSEBuSJ3ckwZpEk6eyDN5JW/exHvx3r2P5eiGV+yckT/wPn8A2zuSEw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rFBO2uAuj4/rkMgJkWbGHvo4/s o=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgMxFL1TX7W+qi7dBIvgqsx0o8uCG5cV7APaoWTSO21oJhmTTKEM/Q43LhRx68e4829MHwttPRA4nH Mv9+REqeDG+v63V9ja3tndK+6XDg6Pjk/Kp2ctozLNsMmUULoTUYOCS2xabgV2Uo00iQS2o/Hd3G9PUBuu5KOdphgmdCh5 zBm1Tgp7JiZoLE+oVbpfrvhVfwGySYIVqcAKjX75qzdQLEtQWiaoMd3AT22YU205Ezgr9TKDKWVjOsSuo5ImaMJ8EXpGrp wyILHS7klLFurvjZwmxkyTyE26dCOz7s3F/7xuZuPbMOcyzSxKtjwUZ4JYReYNkAHXyKyYOkKZ5i4rYSOqKbOup5IrIVj/ 8iZp1aqBXw0eapW6v6qjCBdwCdcQwA3U4R4a0AQGT/AMr/DmTbwX7937WI4WvNXOOfyB9/kD29uSFQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rFBO2uAuj4/rkMgJkWbGHvo4/s o=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgMxFL1TX7W+qi7dBIvgqsx0o8uCG5cV7APaoWTSO21oJhmTTKEM/Q43LhRx68e4829MHwttPRA4nH Mv9+REqeDG+v63V9ja3tndK+6XDg6Pjk/Kp2ctozLNsMmUULoTUYOCS2xabgV2Uo00iQS2o/Hd3G9PUBuu5KOdphgmdCh5 zBm1Tgp7JiZoLE+oVbpfrvhVfwGySYIVqcAKjX75qzdQLEtQWiaoMd3AT22YU205Ezgr9TKDKWVjOsSuo5ImaMJ8EXpGrp wyILHS7klLFurvjZwmxkyTyE26dCOz7s3F/7xuZuPbMOcyzSxKtjwUZ4JYReYNkAHXyKyYOkKZ5i4rYSOqKbOup5IrIVj/ 8iZp1aqBXw0eapW6v6qjCBdwCdcQwA3U4R4a0AQGT/AMr/DmTbwX7937WI4WvNXOOfyB9/kD29uSFQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rFBO2uAuj4/rkMgJkWbGHvo4/s o=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgMxFL1TX7W+qi7dBIvgqsx0o8uCG5cV7APaoWTSO21oJhmTTKEM/Q43LhRx68e4829MHwttPRA4nH Mv9+REqeDG+v63V9ja3tndK+6XDg6Pjk/Kp2ctozLNsMmUULoTUYOCS2xabgV2Uo00iQS2o/Hd3G9PUBuu5KOdphgmdCh5 zBm1Tgp7JiZoLE+oVbpfrvhVfwGySYIVqcAKjX75qzdQLEtQWiaoMd3AT22YU205Ezgr9TKDKWVjOsSuo5ImaMJ8EXpGrp wyILHS7klLFurvjZwmxkyTyE26dCOz7s3F/7xuZuPbMOcyzSxKtjwUZ4JYReYNkAHXyKyYOkKZ5i4rYSOqKbOup5IrIVj/ 8iZp1aqBXw0eapW6v6qjCBdwCdcQwA3U4R4a0AQGT/AMr/DmTbwX7937WI4WvNXOOfyB9/kD29uSFQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rFBO2uAuj4/rkMgJkWbGHvo4/s o=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgMxFL1TX7W+qi7dBIvgqsx0o8uCG5cV7APaoWTSO21oJhmTTKEM/Q43LhRx68e4829MHwttPRA4nH Mv9+REqeDG+v63V9ja3tndK+6XDg6Pjk/Kp2ctozLNsMmUULoTUYOCS2xabgV2Uo00iQS2o/Hd3G9PUBuu5KOdphgmdCh5 zBm1Tgp7JiZoLE+oVbpfrvhVfwGySYIVqcAKjX75qzdQLEtQWiaoMd3AT22YU205Ezgr9TKDKWVjOsSuo5ImaMJ8EXpGrp wyILHS7klLFurvjZwmxkyTyE26dCOz7s3F/7xuZuPbMOcyzSxKtjwUZ4JYReYNkAHXyKyYOkKZ5i4rYSOqKbOup5IrIVj/ 8iZp1aqBXw0eapW6v6qjCBdwCdcQwA3U4R4a0AQGT/AMr/DmTbwX7937WI4WvNXOOfyB9/kD29uSFQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rFBO2uAuj4/rkMgJkWbGHvo4/s o=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgMxFL1TX7W+qi7dBIvgqsx0o8uCG5cV7APaoWTSO21oJhmTTKEM/Q43LhRx68e4829MHwttPRA4nH Mv9+REqeDG+v63V9ja3tndK+6XDg6Pjk/Kp2ctozLNsMmUULoTUYOCS2xabgV2Uo00iQS2o/Hd3G9PUBuu5KOdphgmdCh5 zBm1Tgp7JiZoLE+oVbpfrvhVfwGySYIVqcAKjX75qzdQLEtQWiaoMd3AT22YU205Ezgr9TKDKWVjOsSuo5ImaMJ8EXpGrp wyILHS7klLFurvjZwmxkyTyE26dCOz7s3F/7xuZuPbMOcyzSxKtjwUZ4JYReYNkAHXyKyYOkKZ5i4rYSOqKbOup5IrIVj/ 8iZp1aqBXw0eapW6v6qjCBdwCdcQwA3U4R4a0AQGT/AMr/DmTbwX7937WI4WvNXOOfyB9/kD29uSFQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rFBO2uAuj4/rkMgJkWbGHvo4/s o=">AAAB9HicbVDLSgMxFL1TX7W+qi7dBIvgqsx0o8uCG5cV7APaoWTSO21oJhmTTKEM/Q43LhRx68e4829MHwttPRA4nH Mv9+REqeDG+v63V9ja3tndK+6XDg6Pjk/Kp2ctozLNsMmUULoTUYOCS2xabgV2Uo00iQS2o/Hd3G9PUBuu5KOdphgmdCh5 zBm1Tgp7JiZoLE+oVbpfrvhVfwGySYIVqcAKjX75qzdQLEtQWiaoMd3AT22YU205Ezgr9TKDKWVjOsSuo5ImaMJ8EXpGrp wyILHS7klLFurvjZwmxkyTyE26dCOz7s3F/7xuZuPbMOcyzSxKtjwUZ4JYReYNkAHXyKyYOkKZ5i4rYSOqKbOup5IrIVj/ 8iZp1aqBXw0eapW6v6qjCBdwCdcQwA3U4R4a0AQGT/AMr/DmTbwX7937WI4WvNXOOfyB9/kD29uSFQ==</latexit>
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Figure 1: The effect of the adversary on the data model, and the inferential decisions involved.
2.2 Compound Decisions
The estimation objective constantly faces the uncertainty about whether an adversary exists. Furthermore,
when one is deemed to exist, there is additional uncertainty pertaining to the number and the locations of
the coordinates in which the data is being compromised. Hence, forming the estimate Xˆ(Y) is inherently
entwined with discerning the true model of the data. Decoupling the decisions for isolating the model and
estimating the parameter under the isolated model does not generally render optimal performance. In fact,
there exist extensive studies on formalizing and analyzing such compound decisions, which generally aim
to decouple the inferential decisions. In [22], it is shown that generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) is not
always optimal and necessary and sufficient conditions for its asymptotic optimality are provided. Moreover,
note that GLRT utilizes maximum likelihood estimates of unknown parameters in its decision rule and thus,
it is primarily focused on the detection performance. In [21], the problem of signal detection and estimation
in noise is investigated under the Bayes criterion. In [23] and [24], non-asymptotic frameworks for optimal
joint detection and estimation are developed. Specifically, in [23], a binary hypothesis testing problem is
investigated in which one hypothesis is composite and consists of an unknown parameter to be estimated.
In [24], the theory in [23] is extended to a composite binary hypothesis testing problem in which both
hypotheses correspond to composite models.
2.3 Decision Cost Functions
2.3.1 Attack Detection Costs
The possibility of having multiple alternatives to the attack-free model renders the model detection problem
as the following (T + 1)− composite hypothesis testing problem.
H0 : Y ∼ f(Y | X), with X ∼ pi(X)
Hi : Y ∼ fi(Y | X), with X ∼ pi(X) , for ∈ {1, . . . , T}
. (4)
where H0 is the hypothesis corresponding to the attack-free setting, and Hi is the hypothesis corresponding
to an attack launched at the coordinates in Si ∈ S. For the convenience in notations, throughout the rest
of the paper we denote the attack-free data model by f0(· | X), i.e., f0(· | X) = f(· | X). To formalize
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relevant costs for the detection decisions, we define D ∈ {H0, . . . ,HT } as the decision on the hypothesis
testing problem in (4), and T ∈ {H0, . . . ,HT } as the true hypothesis. We adopt a general randomized
test δ(Y) , [δ0(Y), . . . , δT (Y)] for discerning the true hypothesis, where δi(Y) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
probability of deciding in favor of Hi. Clearly,
T∑
i=0
δi(Y) = 1 . (5)
Hence, the likelihood of deciding in favor of Hj while the true model is Hi is given by
P(D=Hj |T=Hi) =
∫
Y
δj(Y)fi(Y) dY . (6)
We define Pmd as the aggregate probability of incorrectly identifying the true model under the presence of
compromised coordinates, i.e.,
Pmd(δ) , P(D 6= T | T 6= H0)
=
1
P(T 6= H0)
T∑
i=1
P(D 6= Hi | T = Hi)P(T = Hi) (7)
=
T∑
i=1
i
1− 0 · P(D 6= Hi | T = Hi) . (8)
Furthermore, we define Pfa as the aggregate probability of erroneously declaring that a set of coordinates
are compromised, while operating in an attack-free scenario. We have
Pfa(δ) , P(D 6= H0 | T = H0) =
T∑
i=1
P(D=Hi |T=H0) . (9)
2.3.2 Secure Estimation Costs
In this subsection, we define two estimation cost functions for capturing the fidelity of the estimate Xˆ(Y)
we aim to form for X . For this purpose, we adopt a generic and non-negative cost function C(X,U(Y))
to quantify the discrepancy between the ground truth X and a generic estimator U(Y). Based on this,
corresponding to each model Hi and given data Y we first define the average posterior cost function as
Cp,i(U(Y) | Y) , Ei [C(X,U(Y)) | Y] , ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , T} , (10)
where the conditional expectation is with respect to X when the true model is Hi. Besides this, due to
having distinct data models under different attack models, we consider having possibly distinct estimators
under different models. Driven by this, we consider the design for an estimate for X under each model. We
denote the estimate of X under model Hi by Xˆi(Y), and accordingly, we define
Xˆ(Y) , [Xˆ0(Y), . . . , XˆT (Y)] . (11)
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Considering such distinct estimators, the estimation cost C(X, Xˆi(Y)) is relevant only if the decision is Hi.
Hence, for any generic estimator Ui(Y) of X under model Hi, we define the decision-specific average cost
function as
Ji(δi, Ui(Y)) , Ei[C(X,Ui(Y)) | D = Hi] , ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , T} , (12)
where the conditional expectation is with respect to X and Y. Accordingly, we define an aggregate average
estimation cost according to
J(δ,U) , max
i∈{0,...,T}
Ji(δi, Ui(Y)) , (13)
where we have defined U , [U0(Y), . . . , UT (Y)]. Finally, corresponding to the attack-free scenario, in
which the only possible data model is the assumed model f , corresponding to any generic estimator V (Y)
we define the average estimation according to
J0(V ) = E[C(X,V (Y))] , (14)
where the expectation is with respect to X and Y under model f . It is noteworthy that J0 defined in (14)
is fundamentally different from J(δ,U) defined in (13), since the former is the estimation cost when there
is no alternative to f (i.e., the attack-free scenario), while the latter is the estimation cost in an adversarial
setting in which we have decided that the attacker has not compromised the data, which being a detection
decision is never perfect and can be inaccurate with a non-zero probability. The role of J0(V ) in our analysis
is furnishing a baseline for the estimation quality in order to assess the impact of the potential presence of
an adversary on the estimation quality.
3 Secure Parameter Estimation
In this section, we formalize the secure estimation problem. The core premise underlying the notion of se-
cure estimation presented is that there exists an inherent interplay between the quality of estimating X and
the quality of isolating the true model governing the data. Specifically, perfect detection of an adversary’s at-
tack model is impossible. At the same time, the estimation quality strongly relies on the successful isolation
of the true data model. Lack of a perfect decision about the data model is expected to degrade the estimation
quality compared to the attack-free scenario. To quantify such an interplay as well as the degradation in
estimation quality with respect to the attack-free scenario, we provide the following definition.
Definition 1 (Estimation Degradation Factor) For a given estimator V in the attack-free scenario, and
a secure estimation procedure specified by the detection and estimation rules (δ,U) in the adversarial
scenario, we define the estimation degradation factor (EDF) as
q(δ,U, V ) , J(δ,U)
J0(V )
. (15)
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q
<latexit sha1_base64="PkVn6OFcpzs uIiBNZ0hkRoUbCJM=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUDwVvHhswX 5AG8pmO2nXbjZxdyOU0F/gxYMiXv1J3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbmBYng2rjut1NYW9/Y 3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLR2nimGTxSJWnYBqFFxi03AjsJMopFEgsB2Mb2d++wmV5rG8N 5ME/YgOJQ85o8ZKjcd+ueJW3TnIKvFyUoEc9X75qzeIWRqhNExQrbuemxg/o8pwJn Ba6qUaE8rGdIhdSyWNUPvZ/NApObPKgISxsiUNmau/JzIaaT2JAtsZUTPSy95M/M/ rpia89jMuk9SgZItFYSqIicnsazLgCpkRE0soU9zeStiIKsqMzaZkQ/CWX14lrYuq 51a9xmWldpPHUYQTOIVz8OAKanAHdWgCA4RneIU358F5cd6dj0VrwclnjuEPnM8f2T WM7Q==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PkVn6OFcpzs uIiBNZ0hkRoUbCJM=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUDwVvHhswX 5AG8pmO2nXbjZxdyOU0F/gxYMiXv1J3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbmBYng2rjut1NYW9/Y 3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLR2nimGTxSJWnYBqFFxi03AjsJMopFEgsB2Mb2d++wmV5rG8N 5ME/YgOJQ85o8ZKjcd+ueJW3TnIKvFyUoEc9X75qzeIWRqhNExQrbuemxg/o8pwJn Ba6qUaE8rGdIhdSyWNUPvZ/NApObPKgISxsiUNmau/JzIaaT2JAtsZUTPSy95M/M/ rpia89jMuk9SgZItFYSqIicnsazLgCpkRE0soU9zeStiIKsqMzaZkQ/CWX14lrYuq 51a9xmWldpPHUYQTOIVz8OAKanAHdWgCA4RneIU358F5cd6dj0VrwclnjuEPnM8f2T WM7Q==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PkVn6OFcpzs uIiBNZ0hkRoUbCJM=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUDwVvHhswX 5AG8pmO2nXbjZxdyOU0F/gxYMiXv1J3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbmBYng2rjut1NYW9/Y 3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLR2nimGTxSJWnYBqFFxi03AjsJMopFEgsB2Mb2d++wmV5rG8N 5ME/YgOJQ85o8ZKjcd+ueJW3TnIKvFyUoEc9X75qzeIWRqhNExQrbuemxg/o8pwJn Ba6qUaE8rGdIhdSyWNUPvZ/NApObPKgISxsiUNmau/JzIaaT2JAtsZUTPSy95M/M/ rpia89jMuk9SgZItFYSqIicnsazLgCpkRE0soU9zeStiIKsqMzaZkQ/CWX14lrYuq 51a9xmWldpPHUYQTOIVz8OAKanAHdWgCA4RneIU358F5cd6dj0VrwclnjuEPnM8f2T WM7Q==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="PkVn6OFcpzs uIiBNZ0hkRoUbCJM=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUDwVvHhswX 5AG8pmO2nXbjZxdyOU0F/gxYMiXv1J3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbmBYng2rjut1NYW9/Y 3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLR2nimGTxSJWnYBqFFxi03AjsJMopFEgsB2Mb2d++wmV5rG8N 5ME/YgOJQ85o8ZKjcd+ueJW3TnIKvFyUoEc9X75qzeIWRqhNExQrbuemxg/o8pwJn Ba6qUaE8rGdIhdSyWNUPvZ/NApObPKgISxsiUNmau/JzIaaT2JAtsZUTPSy95M/M/ rpia89jMuk9SgZItFYSqIicnsazLgCpkRE0soU9zeStiIKsqMzaZkQ/CWX14lrYuq 51a9xmWldpPHUYQTOIVz8OAKanAHdWgCA4RneIU358F5cd6dj0VrwclnjuEPnM8f2T WM7Q==</latexit>
 
<latexit sha1_base64="rTjShEKXOqLTHJgzY8Zm9B9rkEA=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8 NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqSQiKJ4KXjxWMLXQhrLZTtqlm03YnQil9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5USaFIc/7dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZdJccwx4KlPdjphB KRQGJEhiO9PIkkjiYzS6nfmPT6iNSNUDjTMMEzZQIhackZWCboTEetWaV/fmcFeJX5AaFGj2ql/dfsrzBBVxyYzp+F5G4YRpElzitNLNDWaMj9gAO5YqlqAJJ/Njp+6ZVfp unGpbity5+ntiwhJjxklkOxNGQ7PszcT/vE5O8XU4ESrLCRVfLIpz6VLqzj53+0IjJzm2hHEt7K0uHzLNONl8KjYEf/nlVdK6qPte3b+/rDVuijjKcAKncA4+XEED7qAJA XAQ8Ayv8OYo58V5dz4WrSWnmDmGP3A+fwDBbo6c</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rTjShEKXOqLTHJgzY8Zm9B9rkEA=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8 NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqSQiKJ4KXjxWMLXQhrLZTtqlm03YnQil9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5USaFIc/7dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZdJccwx4KlPdjphB KRQGJEhiO9PIkkjiYzS6nfmPT6iNSNUDjTMMEzZQIhackZWCboTEetWaV/fmcFeJX5AaFGj2ql/dfsrzBBVxyYzp+F5G4YRpElzitNLNDWaMj9gAO5YqlqAJJ/Njp+6ZVfp unGpbity5+ntiwhJjxklkOxNGQ7PszcT/vE5O8XU4ESrLCRVfLIpz6VLqzj53+0IjJzm2hHEt7K0uHzLNONl8KjYEf/nlVdK6qPte3b+/rDVuijjKcAKncA4+XEED7qAJA XAQ8Ayv8OYo58V5dz4WrSWnmDmGP3A+fwDBbo6c</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rTjShEKXOqLTHJgzY8Zm9B9rkEA=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8 NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqSQiKJ4KXjxWMLXQhrLZTtqlm03YnQil9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5USaFIc/7dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZdJccwx4KlPdjphB KRQGJEhiO9PIkkjiYzS6nfmPT6iNSNUDjTMMEzZQIhackZWCboTEetWaV/fmcFeJX5AaFGj2ql/dfsrzBBVxyYzp+F5G4YRpElzitNLNDWaMj9gAO5YqlqAJJ/Njp+6ZVfp unGpbity5+ntiwhJjxklkOxNGQ7PszcT/vE5O8XU4ESrLCRVfLIpz6VLqzj53+0IjJzm2hHEt7K0uHzLNONl8KjYEf/nlVdK6qPte3b+/rDVuijjKcAKncA4+XEED7qAJA XAQ8Ayv8OYo58V5dz4WrSWnmDmGP3A+fwDBbo6c</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rTjShEKXOqLTHJgzY8Zm9B9rkEA=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8 NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqSQiKJ4KXjxWMLXQhrLZTtqlm03YnQil9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5USaFIc/7dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZdJccwx4KlPdjphB KRQGJEhiO9PIkkjiYzS6nfmPT6iNSNUDjTMMEzZQIhackZWCboTEetWaV/fmcFeJX5AaFGj2ql/dfsrzBBVxyYzp+F5G4YRpElzitNLNDWaMj9gAO5YqlqAJJ/Njp+6ZVfp unGpbity5+ntiwhJjxklkOxNGQ7PszcT/vE5O8XU4ESrLCRVfLIpz6VLqzj53+0IjJzm2hHEt7K0uHzLNONl8KjYEf/nlVdK6qPte3b+/rDVuijjKcAKncA4+XEED7qAJA XAQ8Ayv8OYo58V5dz4WrSWnmDmGP3A+fwDBbo6c</latexit>
Pmd( )
<latexit sha1_base64="ZaLt+hMKxEyyogq9sA8ciDfBT60=">AAACD3icbVDLSs NAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0Wpm5KIoLgquHFZwT6gCWEymbRDJ5kwMxFKyB+48VfcuFDErVt3/o2TNAttPTDcwzn3MvceP2FUKsv6Nmorq2vrG/XNxtb2zu6euX/QlzwVmPQwZ1wM fSQJozHpKaoYGSaCoMhnZOBPbwp/8ECEpDy+V7OEuBEaxzSkGCkteeZp5sgQdnOvrFGQtzLH5yyQs0gX6ASEKZSfeWbTalsl4DKxK9IEFbqe+eUEHKcRiRVmSMqRbSXKzZB QFDOSN5xUkgThKRqTkaYxioh0s/KeHJ5oJYAhF/rFCpbq74kMRbJYUHdGSE3koleI/3mjVIVXbkbjJFUkxvOPwpRBxWERDgyoIFixmSYIC6p3hXiCBMJKR9jQIdiLJy+T/ nnbttr23UWzc13FUQdH4Bi0gA0uQQfcgi7oAQwewTN4BW/Gk/FivBsf89aaUc0cgj8wPn8ABMOcmw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ZaLt+hMKxEyyogq9sA8ciDfBT60=">AAACD3icbVDLSs NAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0Wpm5KIoLgquHFZwT6gCWEymbRDJ5kwMxFKyB+48VfcuFDErVt3/o2TNAttPTDcwzn3MvceP2FUKsv6Nmorq2vrG/XNxtb2zu6euX/QlzwVmPQwZ1wM fSQJozHpKaoYGSaCoMhnZOBPbwp/8ECEpDy+V7OEuBEaxzSkGCkteeZp5sgQdnOvrFGQtzLH5yyQs0gX6ASEKZSfeWbTalsl4DKxK9IEFbqe+eUEHKcRiRVmSMqRbSXKzZB QFDOSN5xUkgThKRqTkaYxioh0s/KeHJ5oJYAhF/rFCpbq74kMRbJYUHdGSE3koleI/3mjVIVXbkbjJFUkxvOPwpRBxWERDgyoIFixmSYIC6p3hXiCBMJKR9jQIdiLJy+T/ nnbttr23UWzc13FUQdH4Bi0gA0uQQfcgi7oAQwewTN4BW/Gk/FivBsf89aaUc0cgj8wPn8ABMOcmw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ZaLt+hMKxEyyogq9sA8ciDfBT60=">AAACD3icbVDLSs NAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0Wpm5KIoLgquHFZwT6gCWEymbRDJ5kwMxFKyB+48VfcuFDErVt3/o2TNAttPTDcwzn3MvceP2FUKsv6Nmorq2vrG/XNxtb2zu6euX/QlzwVmPQwZ1wM fSQJozHpKaoYGSaCoMhnZOBPbwp/8ECEpDy+V7OEuBEaxzSkGCkteeZp5sgQdnOvrFGQtzLH5yyQs0gX6ASEKZSfeWbTalsl4DKxK9IEFbqe+eUEHKcRiRVmSMqRbSXKzZB QFDOSN5xUkgThKRqTkaYxioh0s/KeHJ5oJYAhF/rFCpbq74kMRbJYUHdGSE3koleI/3mjVIVXbkbjJFUkxvOPwpRBxWERDgyoIFixmSYIC6p3hXiCBMJKR9jQIdiLJy+T/ nnbttr23UWzc13FUQdH4Bi0gA0uQQfcgi7oAQwewTN4BW/Gk/FivBsf89aaUc0cgj8wPn8ABMOcmw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ZaLt+hMKxEyyogq9sA8ciDfBT60=">AAACD3icbVDLSs NAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0Wpm5KIoLgquHFZwT6gCWEymbRDJ5kwMxFKyB+48VfcuFDErVt3/o2TNAttPTDcwzn3MvceP2FUKsv6Nmorq2vrG/XNxtb2zu6euX/QlzwVmPQwZ1wM fSQJozHpKaoYGSaCoMhnZOBPbwp/8ECEpDy+V7OEuBEaxzSkGCkteeZp5sgQdnOvrFGQtzLH5yyQs0gX6ASEKZSfeWbTalsl4DKxK9IEFbqe+eUEHKcRiRVmSMqRbSXKzZB QFDOSN5xUkgThKRqTkaYxioh0s/KeHJ5oJYAhF/rFCpbq74kMRbJYUHdGSE3koleI/3mjVIVXbkbjJFUkxvOPwpRBxWERDgyoIFixmSYIC6p3hXiCBMJKR9jQIdiLJy+T/ nnbttr23UWzc13FUQdH4Bi0gA0uQQfcgi7oAQwewTN4BW/Gk/FivBsf89aaUc0cgj8wPn8ABMOcmw==</latexit>
( ,U , V ⇤)
<latexit sha1_base64="t5WmAJAb8PnEM73aSWLhUBi/gmI=">AAACFXicbVDLSs NAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0WoUkoioi4LblxWMG2hiWUymbRDJ5kwMxFK6E+48VfcuFDEreDOv3HSZmFbDwxzOOde7r3HTxiVyrJ+jNLK6tr6RnmzsrW9s7tn7h+0JU8FJg7mjIuu jyRhNCaOooqRbiIIinxGOv7oJvc7j0RIyuN7NU6IF6FBTEOKkdJS36zXMtfnLJDjSH/QDQhTaFKfE51Jvf1wdgorfbNqNawp4DKxC1IFBVp989sNOE4jEivMkJQ920qUlyG hKGZkUnFTSRKER2hAeprGKCLSy6ZXTeCJVgIYcqFfrOBU/duRoUjmG+rKCKmhXPRy8T+vl6rw2stonKSKxHg2KEwZVBzmEcGACoIVG2uCsKB6V4iHSCCsdJB5CPbiycukf d6wrYZ9d1FtXhZxlMEROAY1YIMr0AS3oAUcgMETeAFv4N14Nl6ND+NzVloyip5DMAfj6xcxEJ4Z</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="t5WmAJAb8PnEM73aSWLhUBi/gmI=">AAACFXicbVDLSs NAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0WoUkoioi4LblxWMG2hiWUymbRDJ5kwMxFK6E+48VfcuFDEreDOv3HSZmFbDwxzOOde7r3HTxiVyrJ+jNLK6tr6RnmzsrW9s7tn7h+0JU8FJg7mjIuu jyRhNCaOooqRbiIIinxGOv7oJvc7j0RIyuN7NU6IF6FBTEOKkdJS36zXMtfnLJDjSH/QDQhTaFKfE51Jvf1wdgorfbNqNawp4DKxC1IFBVp989sNOE4jEivMkJQ920qUlyG hKGZkUnFTSRKER2hAeprGKCLSy6ZXTeCJVgIYcqFfrOBU/duRoUjmG+rKCKmhXPRy8T+vl6rw2stonKSKxHg2KEwZVBzmEcGACoIVG2uCsKB6V4iHSCCsdJB5CPbiycukf d6wrYZ9d1FtXhZxlMEROAY1YIMr0AS3oAUcgMETeAFv4N14Nl6ND+NzVloyip5DMAfj6xcxEJ4Z</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="t5WmAJAb8PnEM73aSWLhUBi/gmI=">AAACFXicbVDLSs NAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0WoUkoioi4LblxWMG2hiWUymbRDJ5kwMxFK6E+48VfcuFDEreDOv3HSZmFbDwxzOOde7r3HTxiVyrJ+jNLK6tr6RnmzsrW9s7tn7h+0JU8FJg7mjIuu jyRhNCaOooqRbiIIinxGOv7oJvc7j0RIyuN7NU6IF6FBTEOKkdJS36zXMtfnLJDjSH/QDQhTaFKfE51Jvf1wdgorfbNqNawp4DKxC1IFBVp989sNOE4jEivMkJQ920qUlyG hKGZkUnFTSRKER2hAeprGKCLSy6ZXTeCJVgIYcqFfrOBU/duRoUjmG+rKCKmhXPRy8T+vl6rw2stonKSKxHg2KEwZVBzmEcGACoIVG2uCsKB6V4iHSCCsdJB5CPbiycukf d6wrYZ9d1FtXhZxlMEROAY1YIMr0AS3oAUcgMETeAFv4N14Nl6ND+NzVloyip5DMAfj6xcxEJ4Z</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="t5WmAJAb8PnEM73aSWLhUBi/gmI=">AAACFXicbVDLSs NAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0WoUkoioi4LblxWMG2hiWUymbRDJ5kwMxFK6E+48VfcuFDEreDOv3HSZmFbDwxzOOde7r3HTxiVyrJ+jNLK6tr6RnmzsrW9s7tn7h+0JU8FJg7mjIuu jyRhNCaOooqRbiIIinxGOv7oJvc7j0RIyuN7NU6IF6FBTEOKkdJS36zXMtfnLJDjSH/QDQhTaFKfE51Jvf1wdgorfbNqNawp4DKxC1IFBVp989sNOE4jEivMkJQ920qUlyG hKGZkUnFTSRKER2hAeprGKCLSy6ZXTeCJVgIYcqFfrOBU/duRoUjmG+rKCKmhXPRy8T+vl6rw2stonKSKxHg2KEwZVBzmEcGACoIVG2uCsKB6V4iHSCCsdJB5CPbiycukf d6wrYZ9d1FtXhZxlMEROAY1YIMr0AS3oAUcgMETeAFv4N14Nl6ND+NzVloyip5DMAfj6xcxEJ4Z</latexit>
q( ,U , V ⇤)
<latexit sha1_base64="Sb1lrC5qN21 g5dmIl2ujrSrSx5E=">AAACFnicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0WoUksiguKq4MZlBd MWmlgmk0k7dPJwZiKUkK9w46+4caGIW3Hn3zhps7CtB4Y5nHMv997jxowKaRg/Wmlp eWV1rbxe2djc2t7Rd/faIko4JhaOWMS7LhKE0ZBYkkpGujEnKHAZ6bij69zvPBIua BTeyXFMnAANQupTjKSS+vrpQy213Yh5YhyoD9oeYRJl9RnRyurt+5NjWOnrVaNhTA AXiVmQKijQ6uvfthfhJCChxAwJ0TONWDop4pJiRrKKnQgSIzxCA9JTNEQBEU46OSu DR0rxoB9x9UIJJ+rfjhQFIt9QVQZIDsW8l4v/eb1E+pdOSsM4kSTE00F+wqCMYJ4R 9CgnWLKxIghzqnaFeIg4wlIlmYdgzp+8SNpnDdNomLfn1eZVEUcZHIBDUAMmuABNcA NawAIYPIEX8AbetWftVfvQPqelJa3o2Qcz0L5+ARZcnpg=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Sb1lrC5qN21 g5dmIl2ujrSrSx5E=">AAACFnicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0WoUksiguKq4MZlBd MWmlgmk0k7dPJwZiKUkK9w46+4caGIW3Hn3zhps7CtB4Y5nHMv997jxowKaRg/Wmlp eWV1rbxe2djc2t7Rd/faIko4JhaOWMS7LhKE0ZBYkkpGujEnKHAZ6bij69zvPBIua BTeyXFMnAANQupTjKSS+vrpQy213Yh5YhyoD9oeYRJl9RnRyurt+5NjWOnrVaNhTA AXiVmQKijQ6uvfthfhJCChxAwJ0TONWDop4pJiRrKKnQgSIzxCA9JTNEQBEU46OSu DR0rxoB9x9UIJJ+rfjhQFIt9QVQZIDsW8l4v/eb1E+pdOSsM4kSTE00F+wqCMYJ4R 9CgnWLKxIghzqnaFeIg4wlIlmYdgzp+8SNpnDdNomLfn1eZVEUcZHIBDUAMmuABNcA NawAIYPIEX8AbetWftVfvQPqelJa3o2Qcz0L5+ARZcnpg=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Sb1lrC5qN21 g5dmIl2ujrSrSx5E=">AAACFnicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0WoUksiguKq4MZlBd MWmlgmk0k7dPJwZiKUkK9w46+4caGIW3Hn3zhps7CtB4Y5nHMv997jxowKaRg/Wmlp eWV1rbxe2djc2t7Rd/faIko4JhaOWMS7LhKE0ZBYkkpGujEnKHAZ6bij69zvPBIua BTeyXFMnAANQupTjKSS+vrpQy213Yh5YhyoD9oeYRJl9RnRyurt+5NjWOnrVaNhTA AXiVmQKijQ6uvfthfhJCChxAwJ0TONWDop4pJiRrKKnQgSIzxCA9JTNEQBEU46OSu DR0rxoB9x9UIJJ+rfjhQFIt9QVQZIDsW8l4v/eb1E+pdOSsM4kSTE00F+wqCMYJ4R 9CgnWLKxIghzqnaFeIg4wlIlmYdgzp+8SNpnDdNomLfn1eZVEUcZHIBDUAMmuABNcA NawAIYPIEX8AbetWftVfvQPqelJa3o2Qcz0L5+ARZcnpg=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Sb1lrC5qN21 g5dmIl2ujrSrSx5E=">AAACFnicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3g0WoUksiguKq4MZlBd MWmlgmk0k7dPJwZiKUkK9w46+4caGIW3Hn3zhps7CtB4Y5nHMv997jxowKaRg/Wmlp eWV1rbxe2djc2t7Rd/faIko4JhaOWMS7LhKE0ZBYkkpGujEnKHAZ6bij69zvPBIua BTeyXFMnAANQupTjKSS+vrpQy213Yh5YhyoD9oeYRJl9RnRyurt+5NjWOnrVaNhTA AXiVmQKijQ6uvfthfhJCChxAwJ0TONWDop4pJiRrKKnQgSIzxCA9JTNEQBEU46OSu DR0rxoB9x9UIJJ+rfjhQFIt9QVQZIDsW8l4v/eb1E+pdOSsM4kSTE00F+wqCMYJ4R 9CgnWLKxIghzqnaFeIg4wlIlmYdgzp+8SNpnDdNomLfn1eZVEUcZHIBDUAMmuABNcA NawAIYPIEX8AbetWftVfvQPqelJa3o2Qcz0L5+ARZcnpg=</latexit>
Figure 2: Performance region.
Based on this definition, next we define the performance region, which encompasses all the pairs of decision
qualities q(δ,U, V ) and Pmd(δ) over the space of all possible decision rules (δ,U, V ).
Definition 2 (Performance Region) We define the performance region as the region of all simultaneously
achievable estimation quality q(δ,U, V ) and detection performance Pmd(δ).
By leveraging the characteristics of the performance region, next we define the notion of (q, β)-security,
which is instrumental in defining the secure estimation problem of interest. For this purpose, note that EDF
normalizes the estimation cost in the adversarial setting by that of the attack-free scenario. The two estima-
tion cost functions involved in q(δ,U, V ) can be computed independently, and as a result, determining their
attendant decision rules can be carried out independently. For this purpose, we define V ∗ as the optimal
decision rule under the attack-free setting, and J∗0 as the corresponding estimation cost, i.e.,
V ∗ , arg min
V
J0(V ) , and J∗0 , min
V
J0(V ) . (16)
Definition 3 ((q, β)-security) An estimation procedure specified by (δ,U, V ∗) for the adversarial scenario
is said to be (q, β)-secure if the decision rules (δ,U) yield the minimal EDF among all the decision rules
corresponding to which the average rate of missing the attacks does not exceed β ∈ (0, 1], i.e.,
q , min
δ,U
q(δ,U, V ∗) , s.t. Pmd(δ) ≤ β . (17)
The performance region, and its boundary that specifies the interplay between q and β are illustrated in
Fig. 2. Based on these definitions, we aim to characterize:
1. The region of all simultaneously achievable values of q(δ,U, V ∗) and Pmd(δ), which is illustrated by
the dashed region in Fig. 2.
2. The (q, β)-secure decision rules (δ,U, V ∗) that solve (17), and specify the boundary of the perfor-
mance region, which is illustrated by a solid line as the boundary of the performance region in Fig. 2.
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By noting that q(δ,U, V ∗) = J(δ,U)J∗0 , where J
∗
0 is a constant, the performance region and the (q, β)-secure
decision rules are found as the solutions to
Q(β) ,
minδ,U J(δ,U)s.t. Pmd(δ) ≤ β . (18)
SolvingQ(β) ensures that the likelihood of missing an attack is confined below β. However, it is insensitive
to the rate of the false alarms that the decision rules can generate. In case the statistician wishes to also
control the rate of false alarms, that is the rate of erroneously declaring an attack while there is no attack,
we can further extend the notion of (q, β)-security as follows.
Definition 4 An estimation procedure is (q, α, β)-secure if it is (q, β)-secure and the likelihood of false
alarms does not exceed α ∈ (0, 1].
The optimal decision rules that yield (q, α, β)-secure decisions can be found as the solution to
P(α, β) =

minδ,U J(δ,U)
s.t. Pmd(δ) ≤ β
Pfa(δ) ≤ α
. (19)
Remark 1 It can be easily verified that Q(β) = P(1, β).
Remark 2 (Feasibility) The probabilities Pmd(δ) and Pfa(δ) cannot be made arbitrarily small simultane-
ously. Specifically, from the Neyman-Pearson theory [25], it can be readily verified that for any given α,
there exists a value β∗(α), which specifies the smallest feasible value for β.
We characterize the optimal solution to problems P(α, β) and Q(β) in closed-forms in Section 4. Close
scrutiny of the optimal decision rules indicates that the complexity of the rules grows exponentially with
the dimension of X , i.e., p, and the number of coordinates that an adversary can compromise, i.e. K.
To address the computational complexity, we address the scalability issue in Section 5. Specifically, we
provide alternative low-complexity decision rules and show that despite their simple structure, they satisfy
asymptotic optimality guarantees.
4 Secure Parameter Estimation: Optimal Decision Rules
In this section, we characterize an optimal solution to the more general problem P(α, β), i.e., the estimators
{Xˆi(Y) : i ∈ {0, . . . , T}} and the detectors {δi(Y) : i ∈ {0, . . . , T}}. We will also specify how the
decision rules simplify for characterizing the solution to the problem Q(β) = P(1, β). In order to proceed,
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we start by providing the expansion of the decision error probability terms Pmd(δ) and Pfa(δ) in terms of
the data models and decision rules. By noting (6) and leveraging (7), we have
Pmd(δ) =
T∑
i=1
i
1− 0
T∑
j=0
j 6=i
∫
Y
δj(Y)fi(Y) dY . (20)
Similarly, by noting (6) and based on (9), we have
Pfa(δ) =
T∑
i=1
∫
Y
δi(Y)f0(Y) dY . (21)
By using the expansions in (20) and (21), the problem of interest in (19) can be equivalently cast as
P(α, β) =

min(δ,U) J(δ,U)
s.t.
T∑
i=1
i
1−0
T∑
j=0
j 6=i
∫
Y
δj(Y)fi(Y) dY ≤ β
T∑
i=1
∫
Y
δi(Y)f0(Y) dY ≤ α
. (22)
The roles of the estimators {Ui(Y) : i ∈ {0, . . . , T}} appear only in the utility function J(δ,U). This
allows for decoupling the optimization problemP(α, β) into two sub-problems, as formalized in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 The optimal secure estimators of X under different models, i.e., Xˆ = [Xˆ0, . . . , XˆT ] is the
solution to
Xˆ = arg min
U
J(δ,U) . (23)
Furthermore, the solution of P(α, β), and subsequently the design of the attack detectors, can be found by
equivalently solving
P(α, β) =

minδ J(δ, Xˆ)
s.t.
T∑
i=1
i
1−0
T∑
j=0
j 6=i
∫
Y
δj(Y)fi(Y) dY ≤ β
T∑
i=1
∫
Y
δi(Y)f0(Y) dY ≤ α
. (24)
This theorem establishes a property for the optimal estimator in (23). By leveraging this property, and also
taking into account the decoupled structure of the problem P(α, β) in (24), in the following theorem we
provide optimal designs for the secure estimators. Interestingly, it is shown that the optimal estimator under
each model can be specified by optimizing a relevant cost function defined exclusively for that model.
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Theorem 2 ((q, α, β)-secure Estimators) For the optimal secure estimators Xˆ we have
1. The minimizer of the estimation cost Ji(δi, Ui(Y)), i.e., the estimation cost function under model Hi,
is given by
U∗i (Y) , arg inf
Ui(Y)
Cp,i(Ui(Y) | Y) . (25)
2. The optimal estimator Xˆ = [Xˆ0, . . . , XˆT ], specified in (23), is given by
Xˆi(Y) = U
∗
i (Y) . (26)
3. The cost function J(δ, Xˆ) is given by
J(δ, Xˆ) = max
i

∫
Y
δi(Y)C
∗
p,i(Y)fi(Y)dY∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)dY
 , (27)
where we have defined
C∗p,i(Y) , inf
Ui(Y)
Cp,i(Ui(Y) | Y) . (28)
Proof: See Appendix A.
For illustration purposes, in the next corollary, we provide the closed-forms of these decision rules when the
distributions {fi(· | X) : i ∈ {0, . . . , T}} are all Gaussian.
Corollary 1 ((q, α, β)-secure Estimators in Gaussian Models) When the data models are Gaussian such
that
fi(· | X) ∼ N (θi, X) , for θi ∈ R , (29)
where the mean values are distinct, and
X ∼ X−1(ζ, φ) , (30)
where X−1(ζ, φ) denotes the inverse chi-squared distribution with parameters ζ and φ, s.t., ζ + n > 4, for
the optimal secure estimators Xˆ, we have:
1. The minimizer of the estimation cost J(δi, Ui(Y)), i.e., the estimation cost function under model Hi,
is given by
U∗i (Y) =
ζφ+
n∑
r=1
‖Yr − θi‖22
ζ + n− 2 . (31)
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2. The optimal estimator Xˆ = [Xˆ0, . . . , XˆT ], specified in (23), is given by
Xˆi(Y) = U
∗
i (Y) . (32)
3. The cost function J(δ, Xˆ) is given by
J(δ, Xˆ) = max
i

∫
Y
δi(Y)C
∗
p,i(Y)fi(Y)dY∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)dY
 , (33)
where we have
C∗p,i(Y) =
2(ζφ+
n∑
r=1
‖Yr − θ1‖2)2
(ζi + n− 2)2(ζ + n− 4) . (34)
Next, given the optimal estimators Xˆ, we characterize the optimal detection rules in the next theorem. The
main observation is that even though we started by considering general randomized decision rules, these
rules in their optimal forms reduce to deterministic ones. Furthermore, the decisions rules depend on the
estimation costs that are computed based on the optimal estimation costs. These estimation costs make
the decisions coupled. In order to proceed, we first show that problem P(α, β) in (24) can be solved by
leveraging the result of the following theorem, which specifies an auxiliary convex problem in a variational
form.
Theorem 3 For any arbitrary u ∈ R+, we have P(α, β) ≤ u if and only ifR(α, β, u) ≤ 0, where we have
defined
R(α, β, u) =

minδ γ
s.t.
∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)[C
∗
p,i(Y)− u] dY ≤ γ, ∀ i ∈ {0, . . . , T}
T∑
i=1
i
1− 0
T∑
j=0
j 6=i
∫
Y
δj(Y)fi(Y) dY ≤ β + γ
T∑
i=1
∫
Y
δi(Y)f0(Y) dY ≤ α+ γ
. (35)
Furthermore,R(α, β, u) is convex, andR(α, β, u) = 0 has a unique solution in u, which we denote by u∗.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The point u∗ has a pivotal role in specifying the optimal detection decision rules. We define the constants
{`i : i ∈ {0, . . . , T + 2}} as the dual variables in the Lagrange function associated with the convex problem
R(α, β, u∗). Given u∗ and {`i : i ∈ {0, . . . , T + 2}}, the optimal detection rules can be characterized in
closed-forms, as specified in the following theorem.
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Theorem 4 ((q, α, β)-secure Detection Rules) The optimal decision rules for isolating the compromised
coordinates are given by
δi(Y) =
 1, if i = i
∗
0, if i 6= i∗
, (36)
where we have defined
i∗ , argmin
i∈{0,...,T}
Ai . (37)
Constants {A0, . . . , AT } are specified by the data models, u∗, and its associated Langrangian multipliers
{`i : i ∈ {0, . . . , T + 2}}. Specifically, we have
A0 , `0f0(Y)[C∗p,0(Y)− u∗] + `T+1
T∑
i=1
i
1− 0 fi(Y) , (38)
and for i ∈ {1, . . . , T} we have
Ai , `ifi(Y)[C∗p,i(Y)− u∗] + `T+1
T∑
j=1,j 6=i
j
1− 0 fj(Y) + `T+2f0(Y) . (39)
Proof: See Appendix C.
In the next corollary, we provide the closed-forms of these decision rules when the distributions {fi(· | X) :
i ∈ {0, . . . , T}} are all Gaussian.
Corollary 2 ((q, α, β)-secure Detection Rules in Gaussian Models) When the data models {fi(· | X) :
i ∈ {0, . . . , T}} have the following Gaussian distributions
fi(· | X) ∼ N (θi, X) , for θi ∈ R , (40)
where the mean values are distinct, and
X ∼ X−1(ζ, φ) , (41)
the optimal decision rules for isolating the compromised coordinates are given by
δi(Y) =
 1, if i = i
∗
0, if i 6= i∗
, (42)
where we have defined
i∗ , argmin
i∈{0,...,T}
Ai . (43)
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Figure 3: Performance region for the Gaussian data model.
Constants {A0, . . . , AT } are specified by the data models, u∗, and its associated Langrangian multipliers
{`i : i ∈ {0, . . . , T + 2}}. Specifically, we have
A0 , `0f0(Y)(C∗p,0(Y)− u∗) + `T+1
T∑
i=1
i
1− 0 fi(Y) , (44)
and for i ∈ {1, . . . , T} we have
Ai , `ifi(Y)(C∗p,i(Y)− u∗) + `T+1
T∑
j=1
j 6=i
j
1− 0 fj(Y) + `T+2f0(Y) . (45)
where C∗p,i(Y) is evaluated using (34) and we have
fi(Y) =
(ζφ)
ζ
2
pi
n
2 Γ(ζ/2)
· Γ(ζ + n)/2
(ζφ+
n∑
r=1
‖Yr − θi‖2)
ζ+n
2
. (46)
By setting T = 1, n = 1, θ0 = 0, θ1 = 2, and selecting ζ = 4, φ = 1, Fig. 3 depicts the performance region
and the associated (q, β)-security curve, which shows the tradeoff between the quality of the detection
and the degradation in the estimation quality. It is noteworthy that this tradeoff is inherently due to the
formulation of the secure estimation problem. Essentially, problem P(α, β) as specified in (19), is designed
to trade the quality of detection in favor of improving the estimation cost.
Based on all the decision rules specified in the section, and the detailed steps of specifying the parameters
involved in characterizing the decision rules, we provide Algorithm 1, which summarizes all the steps for
solving P(α, β) for any feasible pair of α and β.
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Algorithm 1 – Solving P(α, β)
1: input α and β and evaluate β∗(α)
2: if β < β∗(α) then
3: P(α, β) not feasible for given choice of α and β
4: break
5: else
6: Initialize u0 = 0, u1
7: Evaluate optimal posterior estimation costs in (28)
8: repeat
9: uˆ← (u0 + u1)/2
10: for every ˆ`< 0 in the discretized space ‖ˆ`‖1 = 1 do
11: Compute δ from Theorem 4
12: Compute M(ˆ`) , R(α, β, uˆ)
13: end for
14: if minˆ`M(ˆ`) ≤ 0 then
15: u1 ← uˆ
16: `← ˆ`
17: else
18: u0 ← uˆ
19: end if
20: until u1 − u0 ≤ , for  sufficiently small
21: P(α, β)← u∗ = u1
22: return Decision rules δ
23: end if
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5 Scalable Secure Parameter Estimation
As the data dimension m grows, the number of possible data models T grows exponentially. This, subse-
quently, leads to an exponential growth in the complexity of forming the decision rules, e.g., the number
of Lagrangian multipliers needed for characterizing the detection rules scales linearly in T . This can ren-
der Algorithm 1 computationally prohibitive. In order to circumvent the computational complexity, in this
section, we develop a scalable approach to secure estimation, which exhibits optimality properties too. The
core idea is to break down the problem into m coordinate-level problems, treat them individually, and then
aggregate the individual decisions. Specifically, the decisions involve a binary decision on whether the data
is compromised. If the data is deemed to be compromised, then each coordinate is tested individually, and an
estimate of X is formed based on the data of that coordinate. Individual coordinate-level estimates are then
tested for reliability, and combined to form an aggregate estimate for X . Since we need to perform only m
single-coordinate binary detection decisions followed by forming a coordinate-level estimation routine, the
computational complexity scales only linearly in the number of coordinates m, as opposed to exponentially
for forming the optimal decision rules.
5.1 Binary Attack Detection
In the first stage, we perform a binary test to detect whether data is compromised at all. This is carried out
by solving a binary composite hypothesis testing problem given by
Hˆ0 : Y ∼ f(Y | X), with X ∼ pi(X)
Hˆ1 : Y ∼ fˆ(Y | X), with X ∼ pi(X)
, (47)
where Hˆ0 is the hypothesis corresponding to the attack-free setting, and Hˆ1 signifies to the presence of an
attack. Probability distribution fˆ is a mixed distribution given by
fˆ(Y) , 1
1− 0
T∑
i=1
ifi(Y) . (48)
Similarly to the optimal approach of Section 4, to design the decision rules we define the randomized test
δˆ , [δˆ0(Y), δˆ1(Y)], in which δˆi(Y) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of deciding in favor of Hˆi, and we have
δ0(Y) + δ1(Y) = 1. Furthermore, define Dd ∈ {Hˆ0, Hˆ1} and Td ∈ {Hˆ0, Hˆ1} as the decision and the true
hypotheses. Hence, the false alarm rate is given by
P(Dd = Hˆ1 | Td = Hˆ0) =
∫
δˆ1(Y)f(Y) dY , (49)
and the miss-detection rate is given by
P(Dd = Hˆ0 | Td = Hˆ1) =
∫
δˆ0(Y)fˆ(Y) dY . (50)
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Since our aim is to maximize the true detection rate (or minimize (50)) in the first step, we design the
decision rule δˆ using the Neyman Pearson approach. Following the Neyman-Pearson approach, as noted in
Remark 2, we have the following decision rules for the binary detection decision [25].
Theorem 5 (Attack Detection) The optimal attack detection rule that minimized the rate of missing the
attacks subject to a constraint on the false alarms is given by
δˆ0(Y) = 1{ fˆ(Y)
f(Y)
<γ
} + (1− %) · 1{ fˆ(Y)
f(Y)
=γ
} , (51)
δˆ1(Y) = 1{ fˆ(Y)
f(Y)
>γ
} + % · 1{ fˆ(Y)
f(Y)
=γ
} . (52)
where the threshold γ and the probability term % are chosen such that the false alarm constraint is satisfied
with equality.
5.2 Isolating Compromised Coordinates
The outcome of the binary detection rule in Section 5.1 is ruling whether there exists an attack in the data.
If an attack is deemed to exists, in the second step, we carry out an isolation decision, the role of which
is identifying the compromised coordinates. In this subsection, we start by analyzing the optimal isolation
rules when an attack is deemed to exist in Section 5.2.1, and characterize the performance of the optimal
decision rules. This analysis will serve as a baseline for comparing the performance of any alternative low-
complexity isolation rule. Next, we provide an isolation rule in Section 5.2.2 that has low-complexity and
can achieve the same performance asymptotically as that of the optimal decision rule.
5.2.1 Optimal Isolation Rule
If the attack detection rules specified by (51)-(52) determine that the data in one or more coordinates are
compromised, in the next step we aim to identify the compromised coordinates. Isolating the set of compro-
mised coordinates is equivalent to solving the following T -hypothesis testing problem.
Hi : Y ∼ fi(Y | X), with X ∼ pi(X) , for i ∈ {1, . . . , T} . (53)
Define Dis ∈ {H1, . . . ,HT } and Tis ∈ {H1, . . . ,HT } as the decision formed and the true hypothesis,
respectively. We define the randomized test δˆ1(Y) , [δˆ11(Y), . . . , δˆ1T (Y)], in which δˆ1i(Y) ∈ [0, 1]
is the probability of deciding in favor of Hˆi given that we have already decided that part of the data is
compromised, i.e., Hˆ1 is the true hypothesis in (47). Accordingly, we define Pis(δˆ1) as the probability of
making an erroneous decision on the problem in (53), given that the decision in the detection step was Hˆ1.
Therefore, Pis(δˆ1) is given by
Pis(δˆ1) , P(Dis 6= Tis | Dd = Hˆ1) (54)
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=T∑
i=1
T∑
j=1,j 6=i
P(Dis = Hj | Tis = Hi, Dd = Hˆ1) · P(Tis = Hi | Dd = Hˆ1) . (55)
We also denote the error exponent of Pis(δˆ1) as the number of the samples n grows according to
ψ(δˆ1) , − lim
n→∞
logPis(δˆ1)
n
. (56)
In the next theorem, we characterize the optimal decision rule (δˆ1) and the associated error exponent. For
this purpose, we denote the Chernoff information between two probability measures with probability density
functions g and h by
C(g, h) , − log min
α∈(0,1)
∫
gα(x)h1−α(x) dx . (57)
Theorem 6 The decision rule δˆ1 that minimizes Pis(δˆ1) is given by
δˆ1i(Y) =
 1, if i = i
∗
0, if i 6= i∗
, (58)
where
i∗ = arg max
j∈{1,...,T}
fj(Y)P(Tis = Hj | Td = Hˆ1) . (59)
Proof: See Appendix D.
Note that the optimal decision rules will have the same computational complexity as the optimal rules
characterized in Theorem 4.
5.2.2 Asymptotically Optimal Isolation Rule
The optimal decision rule in Theorem 6 has similar drawbacks in terms of computational complexity in high
dimensions as the optimal decision rules discussed in Section 4. In this subsection, we provide an alternative
isolation rule for discerning the compromised coordinates at a lower computational complexity, and show
that this rule is optimal in the asymptote of large number of samples, i.e., n→∞. We denote the alternative
low-complexity decision rule by δ¯1 and start by providing lower and upper bounds on Pis(δ¯1), and show
that these bounds exhibit the same error exponents. To specify a lower bound we first leverage the fact that
Pis(δˆ1) ≤ Pis(δ¯1), which is true due to the optimality of Pis(δˆ1), and define Pis(X, (δ¯1)) as the value of
Pis(δ¯1) when the unknown parameter X is fully known (e.g., provided by a genie). Clearly, when X is
fully known, the error probability decreases, as part of the model uncertainty due to the unknown parameter
is removed, and the decision problem reduces to a purely detection problem. To specify the upper bound
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on Pis(δ¯1), we define Pis(Xc, δ¯1) as the value of Pis(δ¯1) when X is assumed to take an arbitrary value
Xc ∈ Rp. Note that replacing X by arbitrarily chosen Xc induces sub-optimality compared to the optimal
case in which optimal estimation is performed. The following lemma specifies the bounds on Pis(δ¯1).
Lemma 1 There exists some Xc ∈ Rp, such that
Plis , Pis(X, (δˆ1)) ≤ Pis(δˆ1) ≤ Pis(δ¯1) ≤ Puis , Pis(Xc, (δ¯1)) . (60)
This lemma is instrumental in establishing the error exponent of the alternative low-complexity decision rule
that we will provide. To proceed, corresponding to each coordinate l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we define the likelihood
ratio term
LRl(Y) ,
n∏
r=1
g1l (Yr(l))
g0l (Yr(l))
, (61)
where g0l and g
1
l denote the marginal pdfs of the data at coordinate l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} under the attack-free
setting and when the coordinate is compromised, respectively. In the next theorem, we show that a decision
rule based on calculating these likelihood ratio terms suffices to reach a decision that achieves the same error
exponent as the optimal decision rule specified in (54).
Theorem 7 The isolation rule
δ¯1i(Y) =
 1, if i = i
∗
0, if i 6= i∗
, (62)
in which we have defined
i∗ = arg max
i∈{1,...T}
∏
v∈Si
LRv(Y) , (63)
has the following error exponent
ψ(δ¯1) = min
i 6=j∈{1,...,T}
C(fi, fj) . (64)
which is equal to ψ(δˆ1), i.e., the error exponent of the optimal rule.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Therefore, the error probabilities corresponding to the optimal decision rule in Theorem 6 and the low-
complexity alternative rule Theorem 7 decay at the same rate with the increasing number of samples n,
rendering the decision rule in Theorem 7 asymptotically optimal. Clearly, the decision rule based on the
marginal likelihood ratios significantly reduces the computational complexity for isolating the attacked co-
ordinates. This reduction in computational complexity is viable at the expense of accuracy of the isolation
when we have a small number of samples. In the next subsection, we discuss how the attack detection and
coordinate isolation decisions characterized so far are leveraged for forming an estimate of X .
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5.3 Coordinate-based Secure Estimation
The decision rules in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 have already produced decisions about whether each
individual coordinate is compromised. In the third stage of the decisions, we form one estimate of X based
on all the n samples available at each coordinate. This leads to forming m distinct estimates for X , one
corresponding to each coordinate. Clearly, not all the estimates can be deemed reliable, especially when
some of the coordinates are compromised. For this purpose, after forming the m estimates we perform a
reliability test, the purpose of which is discarding the unreliable estimates and retaining and aggregating the
reliable ones. We provide relevant estimation cost functions in Section 5.3.1, and characterize the reliability
test in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Cost Functions
Based on the sequence of the data points at each coordinate, we form an estimate of X corresponding to
each coordinate, resulting in m distinct estimates for X . Clearly, different coordinates produce estimates
of X with potentially different qualities. Motivated by the fact that the decisions formed in the previous
steps are not perfect and a coordinate might yield an unreliable estimate for X , we consider performing a
reliability test on the decision produced at each coordinate. For this purpose, at each coordinate l and based
on the data available at coordinate l, which we denote by Yl, we perform a binary test to decide whether the
estimate based on the data from coordinate l is reliable or unreliable, denoted by Hrl and H
u
l , respectively.
We define Drl ∈ {Hrl ,Hul } as the decision formed about the reliability of the estimate, and let the ran-
domized test δ¯l(Yl) = [δ¯rl (Yl), δ¯
u
l (Yl)] be the decision rule to decide upon the reliability of the estimate
from coordinate l, where δ¯rl (Yl) is the probability of deciding in favor of H
r
l and δ¯
u
l (Yl) is the probability
of deciding in favor of Hul . Furthermore, we define δl(Y) , [δ0l (Yl), δ1l (Yl)], where δ1l (Yl) denotes the
probability that coordinate l is being compromised based on data Y and the decision rules in Section 5.1 and
Section 5.2, and subsequently, δ0l (Yl) = 1 − δ1l (Yl). Hence, the likelihood of forming a reliable estimate
at coordinate l given that we have decided that coordinate l is not compromised is given by
P0(Drl = Hrl) =
∫
δ0l (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)g
0
l (Yl)dYl . (65)
Similarly, the likelihood of forming a reliable estimate at coordinate l given that we have decided that
coordinate l is compromised is given by
P1(Drl = Hrl) =
∫
δ1l (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)g
1
l (Yl)dYl . (66)
Furthermore, consider U0l and U
1
l as the estimates of X at coordinate l when we have decided that the
coordinate is attack-free and compromised, respectively. Hence, the cost associated with U jl when the
decision of the reliability test is Hrl is defined as
J jl (δ
j
l , δ¯
r
l , U
j
l ) , Ej [C(X,U
j
l ) | Drl = Hrl ] (67)
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=∫ ∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)C(U
j
l , X)g
j
l (Yl | X)pi(X)dXdYl∫ ∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl | X)pi(X)dXdYl
(68)
=
∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)C
j
l (U
j
l | Yl)gjl (Yl)dYl∫
δlj(Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl
, (69)
where Cjl (U
j
l | Yl) is the posterior estimation cost at coordinate l. We define the optimal average estimation
cost as
Cˆjl (Yl) , min
Ujl
Cjl (U
j
l | Yl) , (70)
and the optimal coordinate-level estimators as
Xˆjl (Yl) , arg min
Ujl
Cjl (U
j
l | Yl) . (71)
5.3.2 Reliability Decision Rules
For the probabilities of forming a reliable estimate at coordinate l defined in (65) and (66) we have
Pj(Drl = Hrl) =
∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl , (72)
≤
∫
δjl (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl (73)
= ρjl , (74)
where (1 − ρ0l ) and (1 − ρ0l ) are the Type-I and Type-II probabilities of mis-classifying the status of co-
ordinate l. Therefore, the probability of forming a reliable estimate, when coordinate l is deemed to be
compromised or attack-free is upper bounded by ρ1l and ρ
0
l , respectively. This implies that only a fraction
of the decisions on the true model of data at coordinate l will provide reliable estimates. We wish to have
decision rules that control the fraction of the reliable estimates to be beyond a pre-specified level. Obviously,
these desired levels should also be within the feasible range. For this purpose, we select νjl ∈ [0, ρjl ], and
impose a lower bound on the fraction of the reliable estimates that the reliability test retains according to
Pj(Drl = Hrl) ≥ νjl . (75)
Based on the cost functions and decision constraints, the decision rules δ¯l and the estimators U
j
l are deter-
mined by solving m problems in parallel, where the problem to be solved corresponding to coordinate l is
given by
S(νjl ) ,
minδ¯l,Ujl J
j
l (δ
j
l , δ¯
r
l , U
j
l )
s.t. Pj(Drl = Hrl) ≥ νjl
. (76)
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Similarly to the discussion in Section 4, since the effect of the estimatorsU jl appears only in the cost function
J jl (δ
j
l , δ¯
r
l , U
j
l ), the optimization problem in (76) can be decoupled into two subproblems as formalized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 8 For given ν0l and ν
1
l , the optimal decision rules for the problems S(ν0l ) and S(ν1l ) are given by
Cˆ0l (Yl)
Hul
≷
Hrl
γ0l if coordinate l is deemed attack-free , (77)
Cˆ1l (Yl)
Hul
≷
Hrl
γ1l if coordinate l is deemed compromised , (78)
where γ1l and γ
0
l are selected such that the constraints in (76) are satisfied with equality. The optimal
estimate that solve S(ν0l ) and S(ν1l ) are the estimators Xˆ0l (Yl) and Xˆ1l (Yl), respectively, defined in (71).
Proof: See Appendix F.
For given data Y, performing the reliability test in Theorem 8 retains the estimates deemed reliable.
These estimates, subsequently, can be aggregated to form a single estimate for X . The estimation approach,
which consists of global binary attack detection, followed by coordinate-level isolation of compromised co-
ordinates and local estimates, and completed by aggregating the reliable coordinate-level estimates, renders
a scalable approach to the secure estimation of interest. This approach is significantly less complex as com-
pared to the optimal estimation rules characterized in Theorem 2. Finally, we remark that aggregating the
local estimates is a well-investigated problem, to which there exists a broad range of solutions with varying
degrees of optimality under various settings. Representative approaches to such aggregation include the
studies in [26–29]. A summary of the steps involved in the scalable approach is provided in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 – Scalable and Asymptotically Optimal Solution to P(α, β)
1: input feasible ν0l and ν
1
l for all coordinates l
2: Binary attack detection
3: if Attack exists then
4: Isolate the true model using decision rule in Theorem 7
5: end if
6: Form estimates based on data at each coordinate
7: Test for estimate reliability at each coordinate using decision rules in Theorem 8
8: Aggregate reliable coordinate level estimates to form the final estimate
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6 Case Studies: Secure Estimation in Sensor Networks
We use the example of a sensor network consisting of two sensors and a fusion center (FC) to evaluate the
estimation frameworks presented in this paper. Each sensor is collecting a stream of data. Sensor i ∈ {1, 2}
collects n measurements, denoted by Yi = [Y i1 , . . . , Y
i
n], where each sample Y
i
j ∈ R in an attack-free
environment is related to X according to
Y ij = h
iX +N ij , (79)
where hi models the channel connecting sensor i to the FC and N ij accounts for the additive channel noise.
Different noise terms are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) generated according
to a known distribution. We will consider two adversarial scenarios that impact the data model in (79) and
evaluate the optimal performance, as well as the application of the asymptotically optimal scalable algorithm
when the number of the samples n tends to infinity.
6.1 Case 1: One Sensor Vulnerable to Causative Attacks
We start by considering an adversarial setting in which the data model of the measurements from only one
sensor (sensor 1) are vulnerable to a causative attack, while the other sensor (sensor 2) remains attack-free.
Under such a setting, we have only one attack scenario, i.e., T = 1 and S1 = {1}. Accordingly, we have
0 + 1 = 1. Under the attack-free scenario, we assume that the noise terms N ij are i.i.d. and distributed
according to N (0, σ2n), i.e.,
Y ij | X ∼ N (hiX,σ2n) . (80)
When data from sensor 1 is compromised, the actual conditional distribution of Y 1j |X is distinct from the
above distribution assumed by the statistician. The inference objective under such a setting, in principle,
becomes similar to the adversarial setting of [5], which focuses on data injection. Hence, in order to be
able to compare the performance of the optimal framework with that of [5], we assume that the conditional
distribution of Y 1j |X when sensor 1 is under a causative attack is N (hiX,σ2n) ∗ Unif[a, b], where a, b ∈ R
are fixed constants and ∗ denotes convolution. Therefore, the composite hypothesis test for estimating X
and discerning the model in (4) simplifies to the following binary test with the prior probabilities 0 and 1,
in which we have defined Y = [Y1,Y2].
H0 : Y ∼ f0(Y | X), with X ∼ N (0, σ2)
H1 : Y ∼ f1(Y | X), with X ∼ N (0, σ2)
, (81)
Figure 4 depicts the variations of the estimation quality, captured by q, versus the tolerable miss-detection
rate β, where it is observed that the estimation quality improves monotonically as β increases, and it reaches
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its maximum quality when β = 1. This observation is in line with what is expected analytically from the
formulation of the secure parameter estimation problems in (18) and (19).
A similar setting is studied in [5], where the attack is induced additively into the data of sensor 1 and
can be any real number. This setting can be studied in the context of causative attacks where the attacker’s
mode of compromising the data is adding a disturbance which has uniform distribution. Figure 4 also
compares the estimation quality of the methodology developed in this paper, with that obtained by applying
the methodology of [5], which characterizes a single point in the (q, β) plane. Specifically, in [5], an
estimator is designed to obtain the most robust estimate by exploring the dependence of the estimation
quality on the false alarm probability, using which an optimal false alarm probability α∗ is obtained, which
in turn, fixes the miss-detection error probability, and does not provide the flexibility to change the miss-
detection rate β.
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Figure 4: q versus β for fixed α∗ = 0.1.
The results presented in Fig. 4 correspond to σ = 3, σn = 1, h1 = 1, h2 = 4, a = −40, b = 40. The upper
bound on Pfa is set to α∗ = 0.1, where α∗ is obtained using the methodology in [5].
6.2 Case 2: Both Sensors Vulnerable to Causative Attacks
We again consider the same model for X , and in this setting, we assume that data from both the sensors
are vulnerable to being compromised. We assume that the attacker can compromise the data of at most one
sensor at any instant. Under such a setting, we have T = 2, S1 = {1}, and S2 = {2}. Therefore, under the
adversarial setting, the sensor measurements follow the following composite hypothesis model
H0 : Y ∼ f0(Y | X), with X ∼ pi(X)
H1 : Y ∼ f1(Y | X), with X ∼ pi(X)
H2 : Y ∼ f2(Y | X), with X ∼ pi(X)
, (82)
where H0 corresponds to the attack-free setting, and hypothesis Hi corresponds to the data of sensor i being
compromised. Motivating by the fact that the sensor with the higher gain hi is expected to generate a better
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estimate, we explore a scenario in which the sensor with the higher gain is more likely to be attacked. Hence,
we select the parameters h1 = 1, and h2 = 2, and set the probabilities (0, 1, 2) = (0.2, 0.2, 0.6). We set
the distribution of X to Unif[−2, 2]. We assume that Y ij , for i ∈ {1, 2}, given X , is distributed according
to N (hiX, 1) in the attack-free setting. When sensor i is compromised, we assume that Y ij , for i ∈ {1, 2},
given X , follows the distribution N (hiX, 5).
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Figure 5: q versus β for different values of α.
Figure 5 depicts the performance region defined in Fig. 2, which specifies the variations of q versus β
for three different values of α. The region spanned by the plots between q and β for different values of
α is the feasible region of operation for the secure estimation methodology developed in this paper. This
provides the FC with the flexibility to adjust the emphasis on each of the estimation or detection decisions.
As expected, the estimation quality improves monotonically as α and β increase.
6.3 Case 3: Evaluation of Scalable Secure Parameter Estimation Framework
Before comparing the estimation performance from the scalable approach developed in Section 5 and the
optimal approach, we illustrate the asymptotic optimality of the decision rule proposed in Theorem 7. Con-
sider a 2 sensor network, where the measurements of at least one sensor are compromised at any instant.
The measurements of the sensors follow a similar model as described in (79). Assuming that the parameter
X follows the distribution N (0, σ2), Y ij given X is distributed according to N (hiX,σ21) under the attack-
free scenario and according to N (hiX,σ22) when sensor i is compromised, we illustrate the variations of
− log(Pis(δ¯1)) versus the number of observations at each sensor in Fig. 6. For the results in Fig. 6, we set
h1 = 1, h2 = 4, σ2 = 4, σ21 = 2 and σ
2
2 = 6 . The error probabilities corresponding to both decision rules
decay exponentially at the same rate with the increase in number of observations at each sensor.
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Figure 6: log(Pis(δ¯1)) versus number of observations at each sensor.
In order to compare the performance of the scalable secure estimation framework with that of the optimal
framework, we choose ν0l and ν
1
l , for l ∈ {1, 2}, according to the steps described in Algorithm 2. We
aggregate the reliable local estimates to form an optimal linear estimate at the FC using the fusion strategy
for sensor networks with star topology in [28]. The decision on the reliability of the estimate is formed
using the decision rules in Theorem 8, following which the local linear estimates from the sensors deemed
to provide reliable estimates are aggregated at the FC. To compare with the estimation degradation factor q
for an optimal framework, we evaluate the estimation degradation factor for the scalable secure estimation
framework and denote it by qˆ. The estimation performances for the scalable framework and the optimal
decision rules are compared in the following table:
Table 1: Comparison of Estimation Performance from Optimal Decision Rules and Heuristic Approach
ν01 ν
1
1 ν
0
2 ν
1
2 qˆ α β q
0.2 0.57 0.2 0.5261 1.48 0.0215 0.5134 1.126
0.25 0.4384 0.2 0.658 1.456 0.0216 0.6484 1.046
0.3 0.4467 0.15 0.6359 1.434 0.0482 0.5946 1.060
0.3 0.4467 0.3 0.4124 1.491 0.0762 0.4198 1.151
0.35 0.4021 0.25 0.4832 1.434 0.0528 0.4812 1.136
0.15 0.689 0.35 0.4124 1.44 0.0476 0.476 1.140
For the results presented in Table 1, we have set h1 = h2 = 1. We assume that the parameterX is distributed
according to N (0, 3), N ij is distributed according to N (0, 1) under the attack-free scenario, and according
toN (0, 1)∗Unif[−10, 10] when data from sensor i is compromised. As expected, the optimal decision rules
result in superior estimation quality as compared to that obtained from the scalable framework, i.e., qˆ > q.
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7 Conclusion
We have formalized and analyzed the problem of secure parameter estimation problem under the potential
presence of causative attacks on the estimation algorithm. Under causative attacks, the information of the es-
timation algorithm about the statistical model of the sampled data is compromised. This leads the estimation
algorithm exhibit degraded performance compared to the attack-free setting. We have provided closed-form
optimal decision rules that ensure the best estimation quality (minimum estimation cost) while controlling
the error in detecting the attacks and isolating the true model of the data. We have shown that the design
of optimal estimators is intertwined with the detection rules for deciding upon the true model of the data.
Based on this, we have designed the optimal decision rules, which combine both estimation performance
and detection power. Based on this vision, the decision-maker can place any desired emphasis on the esti-
mation and detection routines involved. to study the trade-off between the two. We have also provided case
studies by applying the theory developed to sensors networks, where sensors face security vulnerabilities.
Finally, to circumvent the computational complexity associated with growing the data dimension or attack
complexity, we have provided a low-complexity secure estimation algorithm that is optimal in the asymptote
of high data dimension.
A Proof of Theorem 2
From (12) we have
Ji(δi, Ui) = E [C(X,Ui(Y)) |D=Hi]
=
∫
Y
∫
X
δi(Y)C(X,Ui(Y))fi(Y |X)pi(X)dXdY∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)dY
.
Using the definition of Cp,i(Ui(Y) | Y) from (10), a lower bound on Ji(δi, Ui(Y)) is given by
Ji(δi, Ui) =
∫
Y
δi(Y)Cp,i(Ui(Y) | Y)fi(Y)dY∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)dY
≥
∫
Y
δi(Y) inf
Ui(Y)
Cp,i(Ui(Y) | Y)fi(Y)dY∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)dY
, (83)
which implies that
Ji(δi, Ui) ≥
∫
Y
δi(Y)C
∗
p,i(Y)fi(Y)dY∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)dY
. (84)
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Based on the definition of Xˆi(Y) provided in (25), this lower bound is clearly achieved when the estimator
Ui(Y) is chosen to be
Xˆi(Y) = arg inf
Ui(Y)
Cp,i(Ui(Y) | Y) , (85)
which proves that the estimator characterized in (25) is an optimal estimator that minimizes the cost Ji(δi, Ui).
The corresponding minimum average estimation cost is
Ji(δi, Xˆi) =
∫
Y
δi(Y)C
∗
p,i(Y)fi(Y)dY∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)dY
. (86)
Next, we prove that
max
i
min
U
{Ji(δi, Ui)} ≡ min
U
max
i
{Ji(δi, Ui)} . (87)
Recall from (13), the overall estimation cost J(δ,U) is defined as
J(δ,U) = max
i
{Ji(δi, Ui)} . (88)
Define C(Ω, δ,U) as a convex function of Ji(δi, Ui), i ∈ {0, . . . , T}, given by
C(Ω, δ,U) ,
T∑
i=0
ΩiJi(δi, Ui) , (89)
where Ω = [Ω0, . . . ,ΩT ], and Ωi satisfy
T∑
i=0
Ωi = 1 , and Ωi ∈ [0, 1] . (90)
We can represent J(δ,U) as a function of C(Ω, δ,U) in the following form
J(δ,U) = max
Ω
C(Ω, δ,U) .
Let Ω∗ = {Ω∗j : j = 0, . . . , T} be defined as
Ω∗ , arg max
Ω
C(Ω, δ,U) ,
where Ω∗j = 1 if
j = arg max
i
{Ji(δi, Ui)} . (91)
From (85) and (86), we observe that
max
Ω
min
U
C(Ω, δ,U) = max
Ω
C(Ω, δ, Xˆ)
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≥ min
U
max
Ω
C(Ω, δ,U) . (92)
Also, at the same time, we have
max
Ω
C(Ω, δ,U) ≥ max
Ω
min
U
C(Ω, δ,U) , (93)
which implies that
min
U
max
Ω
C(Ω, δ,U) ≥ max
Ω
min
U
C(Ω, δ,U) . (94)
From (92) and (94), it is easily concluded that
max
Ω
min
U
C(Ω, δ,U) = min
U
max
Ω
C(Ω, δ,U) , (95)
which completes the proof for (87). Using the results in (87) and (86), the cost function J(δ, Xˆ) is given by
J(δ, Xˆ) = min
U
max
i
{Ji(δi, Ui)}
= max
i
min
U
{Ji(δi, Ui)}
= max
i
{
Ji(δi, Xˆi)
}
(96)
= max
i

∫
Y
δi(Y)C
∗
p,i(Y)fi(Y)dY∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)dY
 . (97)
B Proof of Theorem 3
The function Ji(δi, Ui) is a quasi-convex function. Since the weighted maximum function preserves the
quasi-convexity, it is concluded that Ji(δi, Xˆi) is a quasi-convex function from its definition in (27). There-
fore, we can find the solution by solving an equivalent feasibility problem given below [30]. Specifically,
for u ∈ R+, it is easily observed that
J(δ, Xˆ) ≤ u ≡
∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)(C
∗
p,i(Y)− u)dY ≤ 0, for i ∈ {0, . . . , T} . (98)
Hence, the feasibility problem equivalent to (24) is given by
P(α, β) =

minδ u
s.t.
∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)(C
∗
p,i(Y)− u)dY ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , T}
T∑
j=1
T∑
i=0,i 6=j
j
1−0
∫
Y
δi(Y)fj(Y)dY ≤ β
T∑
i=1
∫
Y
δi(Y)f0(Y)dY ≤ α
. (99)
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The above problem is feasible if P(α, β) ≤ u, where P(α, β) represents the lowest possible value of u
for which the problem is feasible and all the constraints are satisfied. Given an interval [u0, u1] containing
P(α, β), the optimal detection rule δ and the optimal estimation cost P(α, β) can be determined by a bi-
section search between u0 and u1 iteratively, solving the feasibility problem in each iteration. To solve the
feasibility problem, we define an auxiliary convex optimization problem
R(α, β, u) =

minδ η
s.t.
∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)(C
∗
p,i(Y)− u)dY ≤ η, ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , T}
T∑
j=1
T∑
i=0,i 6=j
j
1−0
∫
Y
δi(Y)fj(Y)dY ≤ β + η
T∑
i=1
∫
Y
δi(Y)f0(Y)dY ≤ α+ η
. (100)
Algorithm 1 summarises the steps for determining P(α, β).
Algorithm 3 Bi-section Search
1: Initialize u0, u1
2: repeat
3: uˆ← (u0 + u1)/2
4: SolveR(α, β, uˆ)
5: if J (α, β, uˆ) ≤ 0 then
6: u1 ← uˆ
7: else
8: u0 ← uˆ
9: end if
10: until u1 − u0 ≤ , for  sufficiently small
11: P(α, β)← u1
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C Proof of Theorem 4
To solve the problem in (100), a Lagrangian function is constructed according to
Q(δ, η, `) ,
(
1−
T+2∑
i=0
`i
)
η
+
T∑
i=0
`i
∫
Y
δi(Y)fi(Y)(C
∗
p,i(Y)− u)dY
+ `T+1
T∑
j=1
T∑
i=0,i 6=j
j
1− 0
∫
Y
δi(Y)fj(Y)dY − `T+1β
+ `T+2
T∑
i=1
∫
Y
δi(Y)f0(Y)dY − `T+2α
,
where ` , [`0, . . . , `T+2] are the non-negative Lagrangian multipliers selected to satisfy the constraints
in (24), such that
T+2∑
i=0
`i = 1 . (101)
The Lagrangian dual function is given by
d(`) , min
δ,η
Q(δ, η, `)
= min
δ
(
T∑
i=0
∫
Y
δi(Y)AidY
)
− `T+1β − `T+2α , (102)
where
A0 , `0f0(Y)[C∗p,0(Y)− u] + `T+1
T∑
i=1
i
1− 0 fi(Y) , (103)
and for i ∈ {1, . . . , T},
Ai , `ifi(Y)[C∗p,i(Y)− u] + `T+1
T∑
j=1,j 6=i
j
1− 0 fj(Y) + `T+2f0(Y) . (104)
Therefore, the optimum detection rules that minimize d(`) are given by:
δi(Y) =
 1, if i = i
∗
0, if i 6= i∗
, (105)
where
i∗ = argmin
i∈{0,...,T}
Ai . (106)
Hence, the proof is concluded.
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D Proof of Theorem 6
We can write Pis(δˆ1) as
Pis(δˆ1) =P(Dis 6= Tis | Dd = Hˆ1)
=P(Dis 6= Tis | Dd = Hˆ1,Td = Hˆ0)P(Td = Hˆ0 | Dd = Hˆ1)
+ P(Dis 6= Tis | Dd = Hˆ1,Td = Hˆ1)P(Td = Hˆ1 | Dd = Hˆ1) . (107)
Note that P(Dis 6= Tis | Dd = Hˆ1,Td = Hˆ0) = 1 for any decision rule δˆ1, and the terms
P(Td = Hˆ1 | Dd = Hˆ1) and P(Td = Hˆ0 | Dd = Hˆ1) are independent of the decision rule δˆ1. Therefore,
minimizing Pis(δˆ1) is equivalent to minimizing P(Dis 6= Tis | Dd = Hˆ1,Td = Hˆ1). Furthermore,
P(Dis 6= Tis | Dd = Hˆ1,Td = Hˆ1)
=
P(Dis 6= Tis,Dd = Hˆ1 | Td = Hˆ1)P(Td = Hˆ1)
P(Dd = Hˆ1,Td = Hˆ1)
(108)
=
P(Td = Hˆ1)
P(Dd = Hˆ1,Td = Hˆ1)
×
T∑
i=1
 T∑
j=1,j 6=i
P(Dis = Hi,Dd = Hˆ1 | Tis = Hj ,Td = Hˆ1)P(Tis = Hj | Td = Hˆ1)
 (109)
=
P(Td = Hˆ1)
P(Dd = Hˆ1,Td = Hˆ1)
×
T∑
i=1
(
(1− P(Dis = Hi,Dd = Hˆ1 | Tis = Hi,Td = Hˆ1))P(Tis = Hi | Td = Hˆ1)
)
(110)
=
P(Td = Hˆ1)
P(Dd = Hˆ1,Td = Hˆ1)
×
T∑
i=1
(
(1−
∫
Ri∩Rˆ1
fi(Y)dY)P(Tis = Hi | Td = Hˆ1)
)
, (111)
where Ri ⊆ Yn is the region corresponding to the decision Dis = Hi and Rˆ1 ⊆ Yn is the region corre-
sponding to the decision Dd = Hˆ1. Since we form the decision Dis only when Dd = Hˆ1, we conclude that
Ri ⊆ Rˆ1 and hence, Ri ∩ Rˆ1 = Ri. Therefore,
P(Dis 6= Tis | Dd = Hˆ1,Td = Hˆ1) = P(Td = Hˆ1)
P(Dd = Hˆ1,Td = Hˆ1)
×
T∑
i=1
(
(1−
∫
Ri
fi(Y)dY)P(Tis = Hi | Td = Hˆ1)
)
, (112)
and P(Dis 6= Tis | Dd = Hˆ1,Td) is minimized when the regions Ri are chosen using the decision rule
δˆ1i(Y) =
 1, if i = i
∗
0, if i 6= i∗
, (113)
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where
i∗ = arg max
j∈{1,...,T}
fj(Y)P(Tis = Hj | Td = Hˆ1) . (114)
E Proof of Theorem 7
For the decision rule defined in Theorem 7, we denote the decision formed as D¯is ∈ {H1, . . . ,HT } to
distinguish it from the decision formed by the optimal decision rule in Lemma 6. Also, from Lemma 1,
− logP
u
is
n
≤ − logPis(δ¯1)
n
≤ −Pis(δˆ1)
n
≤ − logP
l
is
n
. (115)
Next, we find an upper bound on Puis. When X is guessed to be Xc, the probability that the decision formed
by the rule in Theorem 7 is Hj when the true model is Hi is given by P(D¯is = Hj | Tis = Hi, Xc). Assuming
that the probabilities i, for i ∈ {1, . . . , T}, are independent of the choice of Xc, we have
Puis =
T∑
i=1
T∑
i 6=j
j=1
jP(D¯is = Hi | Tis = Hj , Xc) (116)
=
T∑
j=2
i<j
(j + i)P
ij , (117)
where we have defined
Pij , j
i + j
· P(D¯is = Hi | Tis = Hj , Xc) + i
i + j
· P(D¯is = Hj | Tis = Hi, Xc) . (118)
Therefore,
Puis ≤
T (T − 1)
2
max
i 6=j;i,j,∈{1,...T}
Pij , (119)
≤ T (T − 1)
2
max
i 6=j;i,j∈{1,...T}
{
P(D¯is = Hi | Tis = Hj , Xc),P(D¯is = Hj | Tis = Hi, Xc)
}
. (120)
Let T ′ , T (T−1)2 . Note that
P(D¯is = Hj | Tis = Hi, X = Xc) ≤
∫
Rij
fi(Y | Xc) dY , (121)
where Rij =
{
Y :
∏
a∈Sj LRa ≥
∏
b∈Si LRb
}
. Define Bi as the set of coordinates deemed to be compro-
mised in Hi but not in Hj , i.e., Bi , Si − Si ∩ Sj , with |Bi| = ri. Similarly, define Bj , Sj − Si ∩ Sj ,
with |Bj | = rj . Also, since we have gjl , for l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {0, 1}, to be conditionally independent
distributions given Xc, we have
fi(Y | Xc) =
∏
a∈Si
(
n∏
c=1
g1a(Yc(a) | Xc)
) ∏
b∈S¯i
(
n∏
d=1
g0b (Yd(b) | Xc)
)
, (122)
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where S¯i , {1, . . . ,m}\Si. Then, the region Rij is equivalent toY :
∏
a∈Bj
n∏
c=1
g1a(Yc(a) | Xc)
∏
b∈Bi
n∏
d=1
g0b (Yb(d) | Xc)
 ≥
∏
a∈Bi
n∏
c=1
g1a(Yc(a) | Xc)
∏
b∈Bj
n∏
d=1
g0b (Yd(b) | Xc)
 . (123)
Therefore,
P(D¯is = Hj | Tis = Hi, Xc) ≤
∫
Rij
∏
a∈Bi
n∏
c=1
g1a(Yc(a) | Xc)
∏
b∈Bj
n∏
d=1
g0b (Yd(b) | Xc)
 dYBi∪Bj ,
(124)
=
∫
Rij
min{t1, t2} dYBi∪Bj , (125)
where YBi∪Bj is the data for the coordinates in the set Bi ∪Bj and
t1 ,
∏
a∈Bi
n∏
c=1
g1a(Yc(a) | Xc)
∏
b∈Bj
n∏
d=1
g0b (Yd(b) | Xc)
 , (126)
t2 ,
∏
a∈Bj
n∏
c=1
g1a(Yc(a) | Xc)
∏
b∈Bi
n∏
d=1
g0b (Yb(d) | Xc)
 , (127)
Using the inequality
min(a, b) ≤ aλb1−λ, ∀ a, b > 0, and λ ∈ [0, 1] , (128)
and ∫
Rij
fi(Y | Xc) dY ≤
∫
fi(Y | Xc) dY , (129)
we can modify the inequality in (124) as
P(D¯is = Hj | Tis = Hi, Xc) ≤
∫
tλ1 t
1−λ
2 dY
Bi∪Bj , ∀ λ ∈ [0, 1] . (130)
Following the similar line of analysis as in (124)-(130), it can be verified that
P(D¯is = Hi | Tis = Hj , Xc) ≤
∫
tλ1 t
1−λ
2 dYBi∪Bj . (131)
The inequalities in (130) and (131) hold for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, from (119), (130) and (131),
Puis ≤ T ′ min
λ∈[0,1]
∫
tλ1 t
1−λ
2 dYBi∪Bj . (132)
36
Under the assumption that the pdfs of the random variables Ya(b) | X, belong to the location-scale family
of distributions with infinite support and only the location parameter a function of X , we use the change of
variables Y˜a(b) = Ya(b) | Xc to obtain∫
tλ1 t
1−λ
2 dYBi∪Bj =
∏
a∈Bj
n∏
c=1
∫
(g1a(Y˜a(c)))
λ(g0a(Y˜a(c)))
1−λ dY˜a(c)

×
∏
b∈Bi
k∏
d=1
∫
(g1b (Y˜b(d)))
λ(g0b (Y˜b(d)))
1−λ dY˜b(d)
 . (133)
Note that
− logP
u
is
n
= − 1
n
log
(
max
i,j
min
λ
∫
tλ1 t
1−λ
2 dYBi∪Bj
)
. (134)
By taking the limit n→∞ and using the monotonicity of the log function, we have
− lim
n→∞
logPuis
n
= lim
n→∞
1
n
min
i,j
max
λ
− log
(∫
tλ1 t
1−λ
2 dYBi∪Bj
)
(135)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
min
i,j
max
λ
∑
a∈Bj
−n log
(∫
(g1a(Y ))
λ(g0a(Y ))
1−λ dY
)
+
∑
b∈Bi
−n log
(∫
(g0b (Y ))
λ(g1b (Y ))
1−λ dY
) . (136)
Therefore,
− lim
n→∞
logPuis
n
= min
i,j
max
λ
∑
a∈Bj
− log
(∫
g1a(Y )
λg0a(Y )
1−λ dY
)
+
∑
b∈Bi
− log
(∫
g0b (Y )
λg1b (Y )
1−λ dY
) . (137)
We now find a lower bound on Plis. Under the perfect knowledge of X , we have
Plis =
T∑
i=1
T∑
j=1
j 6=i
P(Dis = Hj | Tis = Hi, X)i , (138)
=
T∑
i=1
P(Dis 6= Hi | Tis = Hi, X)i , (139)
≥ max
i,j
{P(Dis = Hj | Tis = Hi, X)i,P(Dis = Hi | Tis = Hj , X)j} . (140)
Note that
lim
n→∞−
log(Plis)
n
≤ lim
n→∞−
1
n
log
(
max
i,j
{P(Dis = Hj | Tis = Hi, X)i,P(Dis = Hi | Tis = Hj , X)j}
)
,
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= lim
n→∞−
1
n
log
(
max
i,j
{P(Dis = Hj | Tis = Hi, X),P(Dis = Hi | Tis = Hj , X)}
)
.
(141)
For further analysis, we adopt the approach used in [31]. Under model Hi, the data points Yw are distributed
according to the pdf fi , for w ∈ {1, . . . n} and i ∈ {1, . . . T}. Define bλi,j(Yw) as the pdf
bλi,j(Yw) ,
fλi (Yw | X)f1−λj (Yw | X)∫
fλi (Yw | X)f1−λj (Yw | X)dYw
, (142)
and let
λ∗ = arg max
λ∈[0,1]
− log
(∫
fλi (Y | X)f1−λj (Y | X) dY
)
(143)
= arg max
λ∈[0,1]
−
n∑
w=1
log
(∫
fλi (Yw | X)f1−λj (Yw | X) dYw
)
(144)
= arg max
λ∈[0,1]
−n log
(∫
fλi (Yw | X)f1−λj (Yw | X) dYw
)
. (145)
It can be readily verified that
max
λ∈[0,1]
− log
(∫
fλi (Yw | X)f1−λj (Yw | X) dYw
)
= DKL(b
λ∗
i,j‖fi(. | X)) = DKL(bλ
∗
i,j‖fj(. | X)) , (146)
where DKL(f‖g) denotes the Kullback-Liebler divergence between distributions f and g. Define the prob-
ability measure P˜ as
P˜(Y | X) ,
n∏
w=1
bλ
∗
i,j(Yw) , (147)
and define a random process Mr as
Mr ,
r∑
w=1
(
log
(
bλ
∗
i,j(Yw)
fj(Yw | X)
)
− E
[
log
(
bλ
∗
i,j(Yw)
fj(Yw | X)
)
| Fw−1
])
, (148)
where Fw−1 is the σ−field generated by {Y1, . . . , Yw−1}, and the expectation is with respect to the proba-
bility measure P˜. It can be verified that the process Mr is a stable martingale. According to the martingale
stability theorem [32], we have
lim
r→∞
Mr
r
a.s−→ 0 . (149)
This can be equivalently written in the following form:
lim
r→∞ P˜
(
Mr
r
> ν
)
= 0 , ∀ν > 0 . (150)
Since for a given X the random vectors Yw are i.i.d., we have
E
[
log
(
bλ
∗
i,j(Yw)
fj(Yw | X)
)∣∣∣∣∣Fw−1
]
= DKL(b
λ∗
i,j‖fi(. | X)) = DKL(bλ
∗
i,j‖fj(. | X)) . (151)
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By using (151) and restructuring (150), we obtain
lim
n→∞ P˜
(
n∏
w=1
fj(Yw | X) > exp(−nDKL(bλ∗i,j‖fj(. | X))− nν)×
n∏
w=1
bλ
∗
i,j(Yw)
)
= 1 . (152)
Under the probability measure P˜, we denote the probability of deciding Hi as the true model when X is
given as P˜(Dis = Hi | X) and note that either P˜(Dis 6= Hi | X) ≥ 12 or P˜(Dis = Hi | X) ≥ 12 . Then, using
the assumption that P˜(Dis = Hi | X) ≥ 12 holds, from (152) we get
lim
n→∞ P˜
(
n∏
w=1
fj(Yw | X) > exp(−nDKL(bλ∗i,j‖fj(. | X))− nν)×
n∏
w=1
bλ
∗
i,j(Yw),Dis = Hi | X
)
≥ 1
2
− κ ,
(153)
for any κ > 0. Using (147), we conclude that (153) is equivalent to
lim
n→∞
∫
R
n∏
w=1
bλ
∗
i,j(Yw) dYw ≥
1
2
− κ , (154)
where R is the region{
Y : {Dis = Hi | X} and
{
n∏
w=1
bλ
∗
i,j(Yw | X) < exp(nDKL(bλ
∗
i,j‖fj(. | X)) + nν)×
n∏
w=1
fj(Yw | X)
}}
.
(155)
In the region R, we have∫
R
n∏
w=1
bλ
∗
i,j(Yw | X) dYw ≤ exp(nDKL(bλ
∗
i,j‖fj(. | X)) + nν)
∫
R
n∏
w=1
fj(Yw | X)dY ,
≤ exp(nDKL(bλ∗i,j‖fj(. | X)) + nν)
∫
R2
n∏
w=1
fj(Yw | X)dY ,
= exp(kDKL(b
λ∗
i,j‖fj(. | X)) + nν) · P(Dis 6= Hj | Tis = Hj , X) , (156)
where region R2 is {Dis 6= Hj | X} and also, R ⊆ R2. From (154) and (156), it is concluded that
P(Dis 6= Hj | Tis = Hj , X) ≥
(
1
2
− κ
)
exp(−nDKL(bλ∗i,j‖fj(. | X))− nν) , (157)
for any ν, κ > 0. Similarly, if the case P˜(Dis 6= Hi | X) ≥ 12 holds,
P(Dis 6= Hi | Tis = Hi, X) ≥
(
1
2
− κ
)
exp(−nDKL(bλ∗i,j‖fi(. | X))− nν) . (158)
Using (141), (157) and (158), we have
lim
n→∞−
log(Plis)
n
≤ lim
n→∞−
1
n
max
i,j
{log(P(Dis 6= Hj | Tis = Hj , X)), log(P(Dis 6= Hi | Tis = Hi, X))} ,
(159)
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= lim
n→∞
1
n
(
−
(
1
2
− κ
)
+ κν
)
+ lim
n→∞
1
n
min
i,j
{nDKL(bλ∗i,j‖fi(. | X)), nDKL(bλ
∗
i,j‖fj(. | X))} . (160)
Using the fact that κ and ν can be made arbitrarily close to 0, and using (146), we get
lim
n→∞−
log(Plis)
n
≤min
i,j
max
λ∈[0,1]
− log
(∫
fλi (Yw | X)f1−λj (Yw | X) dYw
)
(161)
= min
i,j
max
λ
∑
a∈Bj
− log
(∫
(g1a(Y ))
λ(g0a(Y ))
1−λdY
)
+
∑
b∈Bi
− log
(∫
(g0b (Y )
λ(g1b (Y ))
1−λdY
) (162)
= min
i 6=j
C(fi, fj) , (163)
where (163) follows from the assumption that the pdfs gja belong to the location-scale family of distributions
and have infinite support. From (137), (162), it is clear that
lim
n→∞−
logPlis
k
= lim
n→∞−
logPuis
n
. (164)
Then, using (115), we conclude that the error exponents of Pis(δˆ1) and Pis(δ¯1) are the same and are given
by (163).
F Proof of Theorem 8
We aim to design the estimator U jl and the decision rule δ¯l that minimize the utility function J
j
l (δ
j
l , δ¯
r
l , U
j
l )
subject to the constraint
Pj(Drl = Hrl) =
∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl ≥ 1− νjl . (165)
Since the effect of estimator only appears in J jl (δ
j
l , δ¯
r
l , U
j
l ), the optimization problem can be decoupled
similarly to the approach followed earlier. The optimal estimator can be readily verified to be
Xˆjl (Yl) = argmin
Ujl
J jl (δ
j
l , δ¯
r
l , U
j
l ) , (166)
where Xˆjl (Yl) is defined in (71). In order to design the decision rules, we start by noting that for a decision
rule δ¯l, such that, ∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl > 1− νjl , (167)
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we can design another decision rule ∆l , [∆rl(Yl),∆ul (Yl)], such that,
∫
δjl (Yl)∆
r
l(Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl =
1− νjl with the same estimation performance. To show this, we set
∆rl(Yl) =
(1− νjl )δ¯rl (Yl)∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl
, (168)
which satisfies (165) with equality. Using (167), note that ∆rl(Yl) < δ¯
r
l (Yl), which implies that ∆l is a
valid decision rule. We can easily verify that
J jl (δ
j
l ,∆
r
l , Xˆ
j
l ) = J
j
l (δ
j
l , δ¯
r
l , Xˆ
j
l ) , (169)
which implies that the estimation performance is the same for both decision rules, and therefore, we can
restrict our design for the optimum decision rule to the class of rules that satisfy (165) with equality. Under
the equality condition,
∫
δij(Yi), δ¯
r
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl = 1 − νjl , in which case minimizing J jl (δjl , δ¯rl , Xˆjl ) is
equivalent to minimizing
∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)Cˆ
j
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl. Let γ
j
l ≥ 0 be the solution to
Pj(γjl ≥ Cˆjl (Yl)) =
∫
Rˆ
δjl (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl = 1− νjl , (170)
where region Rˆ is
{
Yl : γ
j
l ≥ Cˆjl (Yl)
}
. Then,∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)Cˆ
j
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl − γjl (1− νjl )
=
∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)Cˆ
j
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl − γjl
∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl
=
∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)(Cˆ
j
l (Yl)− γjl )gjl (Yl)dYl
≥
∫
Rˆ
δlj(Yl)(Cˆ
j
l (Yl)− γjl )gjl (Yl)dYl
=
∫
Rˆ
δlj(Yl)Cˆ
j
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl − γjl Pj(γjl ≥ Cˆjl (Yl))
=
∫
Rˆ
δjl (Yl)Cˆ
j
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl − γjl (1− νjl ) . (171)
Clearly,
∫
δjl (Yl)δ¯
r
l (Yl)Cˆ
j
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl ≥
∫
Rˆ δ
j
l (Yl)Cˆ
j
l (Yl)g
j
l (Yl)dYl and therefore, the decision rule
δ¯rl (Yl) given by
δ¯rl (Yl) = 1{γjl≥Cˆjl (Yl)} , (172)
is optimal as it ensures optimal estimation performance and satisfies the constraint in (165).
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